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Gerrit De Geestt & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiaccitt
There is a remarkable tendency in modern legal systems to increasingly use
carrots. This trend is not limited to legal systems but can also be observed in, for
instance, parenting styles, social control mechanisms, and even law schools' teach-
ing methods. Yet, at first glance, sticks appear to be a more efficient means of in-
ducing people to comply with legal rules or social norms because they are not
meant to be applied (thus minimizing transaction costs and risks) and may cause
fewer unintended distributional distortions. So how can we justify the widespread
use of carrots?
This Article shows that carrots can be superior in two cases. The first is when
the lawmaker faces specification problems, which means that she does not know
what to expect from each individual citizen (for instance, she may not know which
citizen should spend time composing songs or which part of the cargo of a sinking
ship should be rescued). In those cases, sticks are likely to punish citizens who are
unable to comply with the norm and likely to cause wasteful transaction costs,
risks, and undesirable wealth changes.
The second is when the lawmaker needs to require significantly higher efforts
from some citizens than from others. We use the term singling-out danger to refer
to this problem. This is the case, for instance, when the lawmaker wants only some
families to send a family member to the army, or only some families to sacrifice
land for a highway project. In such cases, sticks would cause significant unintend-
ed distributional distortions (artificially impoverishing those from whom much is
required), making carrots superior.
Overall, our results predict that in societies with more specialization and di-
vision of labor, carrots will be used more often. But they also predict that within
each society, carrots will be used more often in situations that involve a higher de-
gree of complexity. Applications include patents, regulatory takings, contract bo-
nuses, the duty to rescue, finders, information disclosure to contract parties, the
Endangered Species Act, incentives in the military, slavery, health policy, and
parenting.
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INTRODUCTION
A legal system consists of norms that are legally enforced.
But should enforcement happen through carrots such as positive
sanctions, rewards, and bonuses, or through sticks like negative
sanctions, penalties, damages, fines, and imprisonment? This is
one of the most fundamental questions one can ask about a legal
system. But remarkably, we know very little about the answer.'
Legal systems traditionally rely more on sticks than on car-
rots. Tort law and criminal law consist almost solely of sticks.2
Contracts are usually enforced through sticks (damages, specific
performance under the threat of criminal sanctions for contempt
of court, stipulated damages).3 Administrative agencies try to
improve the behavior of citizens by threatening them with fines.4.
Police officers-the archetype of law enforcement-have guns in
their pockets, not dollars or candy.
Yet there is a remarkable tendency in modern legal systems
to increasingly use carrots. Patent and copyright law-two rela-
tively young legal fields-are the poster children of this evolu-
tion; they offer carrots to encourage citizens to invent or produce
art.5 But the trend is much more general than this. Modern legal
systems tend to avoid the stick-based command-and-control ap-
proach to change behavior and try to use subsidies and tax cred-
its more often.6 Modern armies no longer recruit through a stick-
based general conscription but instead use carrots to attract
1 See James Andreoni, William Harbaugh, and Lise Vesterlund, The Carrot or the
Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 Am Econ Rev 893, 893 n 1 (2003).
2 See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Mul-
tiplication Effect, 26 J L, Econ, & Org 365, 367 (2010).
3 See Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contracting, 90 Va L Rev 2187,
2201-02 (2004).
4 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Polit
Econ 169, 193-98 (1968).
5 Patents and copyrights offer a carrot in the form of an exclusive right, which al-
lows the holder during a certain period to charge a supracompetitive price for the use of
the invention or artistic creation. See Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts,
Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J Legal Stud 449, 449-50 (1992).
6 See Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the
Choice of Price Instruments, 64 Stan L Rev 797, 828-30 (2012).
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volunteers.7 Modern law enforcement authorities offer rewards
(in the form of money or sentence reduction) in exchange for in-
formation on crimes, which stands in contrast to the practice of
some older legal systems that induced such cooperation through
the threat of torture.9 Commercial and employment contracts in-
creasingly use bonuses to encourage productive behavior.o
This trend to use carrots is not limited to legal systems.
Modern books on parenting emphasize carrots (appraisal, en-
couragement) rather than sticks (physical punishment, humilia-
tion, shouting)." Social control systems seem to have become
less judgmental, less based on inducing feelings of guilt, and
more based on emphasizing the positive, praising the good.12
Even law schools seem to be abandoning the stick-based as-
pects of the traditional Socratic method (public humiliations for
students who could not answer the professor's questionsa) and
are trying to create a more positive learning environment.14
7 See generally William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Just Compensation:
Lessons from the Military Draft for the Takings Issue, 20 Harv J L & Pub Pol 23 (1996).
8 See Kneave Riggall, Should Tax Informants Be Paid? The Law and Economics of
a Government Monopsony, 28 Va Tax Rev 237, 239-42 (2008).
9 See Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings 39-45 (Cam-
bridge 1995) (Richard Bellamy, ed) (Richard Davies, Virginia Cox, and Richard Bellamy,
trans). Beccaria is credited with being one of the first to reflect on the utility of torture as
an information-acquisition and deterrence device in economic terms. See A. Mitchell Po-
linsky and Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Ger-
rit De Geest, eds, 5 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 307, 321 (Edward Elgar 2000).
10 See Edward P. Lazear, Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations, 5
J Econ Persp 89, 98 (Spring 1991).
11 See, for example, Edward R. Christophersen and Susan L. Mortweet, Parenting
That Works: Building Skills That Last a Lifetime 31-45, 65-66 (American Psychological
Association 2003).
12 See Allan V. Horwitz, The Logic of Social Control 1-5 (Plenum 1990).
13 See, for example, The Paper Chase (20th Century Fox 1973). See also Orin S.
Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method, 78 Neb L Rev 113, 118-19 (1999) ("The most
common complaint against the Socratic method is that it is cruel and psychologically
abusive.").
14 See Kevin K. Washburn, Elena Kagan and the Miracle at Harvard, 61 J Legal
Educ 67, 70-72 (2011); Kerr, 78 Neb L Rev at 129-31 (cited in note 13). How can we ex-
plain this evolution toward a more positive approach within our framework? One expla-
nation is that the questions asked of Harvard law students in The Paper Chase were all
related to the facts of the case and the ruling of the court-relatively simple questions
that every hardworking student should be able to answer. If professors are sure that all
students are able to answer such questions, and if wrong answers result from a lack of
effort, then sticks can make sense (because they will not have to be applied, since all ra-
tional students will prepare for class). But modern professors raise legal issues more fre-
quently in context and ask more complex questions that may require some background
knowledge of political or economic science, philosophy, or psychology. Moreover, the stu-
dent population has become more international and culturally and sociologically diverse.
As a result, professors may have more specification problems; that is, they feel less
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How can we explain this evolution? Despite an emerging lit-
erature on this topic, all insights to this point have been limited
to specific situations or aspects. In this Article, we derive a gen-
eral proposition on the comparative benefits of carrots and
sticks, identifying a heretofore unrecognized benefit of carrots.
Our starting point is that in simple settings sticks are supe-
rior. By "simple setting" we mean a situation in which citizens
have more or less equal compliance costs and the lawmaker
knows these costs and asks for equal efforts from all citizens. In
these cases, sticks are superior because the lawmaker can easily
set them high enough so that all citizens comply. When all citi-
zens comply, sticks do not have to be applied, reducing transac-
tion costs and preventing uncertainty regarding who will be
punished. Moreover, the existing income distribution in society
is not unintentionally changed because all citizens have equal
compliance costs.
But complexity can make carrots superior for two reasons.
The first is when the lawmaker faces specification problems,
which means that she does not know what to expect from each
individual citizen (for instance, she may not know which citizen
should spend time composing songs). In those cases, sticks are
likely to punish citizens who are unable to comply with the norm
and likely to cause wasteful transaction costs, risks, and unde-
sirable wealth changes.
The second is when the lawmaker needs to require signifi-
cantly higher efforts from some citizens than from others. We
use the term singling-out danger to refer to this problem. This is
the case, for instance, when the lawmaker wants only some fam-
ilies to send a family member to the army or only some families
to sacrifice land for a highway project. In such cases, sticks
would cause significant unintended distributional distortions
(artificially impoverishing those from whom much is required),
making carrots superior.
These findings could be reframed in terms of complexity.
Although complexity is a somewhat vague concept, it could serve
as an overarching notion covering the fundamental causes of
heterogeneity (the reason why citizens have different costs and
certain about whether individual students will be able to arrive at the expected answer.
Under these circumstances, sticks would regularly punish the innocent. See Part III.B.
Of course other factors may have played a role. Professors from previous generations
may just have copied the stick-based approach that was common in families and busi-
ness organizations at that time-and which may in turn have been associated with less
complexity. See Part IV.K.
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need to do different things is the division of labor and specializa-
tion among them) and the lawmaker's imperfect information
(the reason why the lawmaker may have great difficulties de-
termining which citizen should do exactly what is that all citi-
zens have different skills or that the citizens have superior in-
formation about situational characteristics).
Overall, our results predict that in societies with more spe-
cialization and division of labor, carrots will be used more often.
But they also predict that within each society carrots will be
used more often in situations that involve a higher degree of
complexity.
While we do not deny that carrots and sticks have many
psychological dimensions too,15 we develop our arguments using
a narrowly defined rational choice framework, as is standard in
economic analysis of law enforcement.16 More specifically, our
framework considers transaction costs, risks, and distributional
side effects. But while we use an economic framework, it would
not be difficult to justify our results on fairness grounds instead.
Our specification problem argument is summarized in the
statement that sticks should not be used when they would pun-
ish the innocent. And our singling-out problem argument is en-
capsulated in the idea that sticks should not be used when the
law requires a significantly higher burden from certain citizens
than from others.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we argue that,
while the law traditionally focuses on sticks, there is a remarka-
ble tendency to increasingly use carrots. We show that the gen-
eral question of whether carrots are better than sticks has re-
ceived very little attention in the literature, which focuses on
particular characteristics of specific applications. In Part II we
offer a theoretical analysis. We show that carrots and sticks can
be objectively defined, explain the framework of our analysis,
and derive seven fundamental differences between carrots and
sticks. We show that sticks are superior in simple settings, when
citizens have similar effort costs and the lawmaker knows these
effort costs, and that carrots can be superior when these condi-
tions are not fulfilled. In Part III we formulate normative guide-
lines for the use of carrots and sticks. We argue that sticks
15 See Lazear, 5 J Econ Persp at 89-90 (cited in note 10).
16 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public En-
forcement of Law, 38 J Econ Lit 45, 47-49 (2000); Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 176-79 (cit-
ed in note 4).
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should be used in simple settings and carrots in the case of spec-
ification problems and singling-out problems. In Part IV we dis-
cuss eleven applications for these principles: patents and copy-
rights, rescuers, finders, takings and regulatory takings, the
Endangered Species Act of 197317 (ESA), incentives to acquire
information in contracts, contract bonuses, incentives in the mil-
itary, slavery societies, health policy, and parenting and educa-
tion. In Part V we summarize and reflect on our findings.
I. PROBLEM AND LITERATURE
Incentives can be generated by either carrots (promises to
reward, such as with prizes or bonuses) or sticks (threats to pun-
ish, such as with fines or damages). Carrots and sticks are pri-
ma facie equivalent because any behavioral change induced by
promising compliers a $100 reward can also be obtained by
threatening violators with a $100 punishment. Yet, while car-
rots and sticks seem to produce the same effects, they are not
chosen at random; some general patterns can be observed across
legal systems. Incentives for careful driving are generally creat-
ed by holding negligent drivers liable under tort law rather than
by rewarding careful drivers.e Likewise, theft is discouraged by
penalizing thieves and not by rewarding those who do not
steal.19 Incentives to invent are created by rewarding successful
inventors with patents or academic prizes rather than by pun-
ishing all others.20
But while there are some patterns in how carrots and sticks
are used across legal systems, there is also a remarkable trend
toward the increased use of carrots in complex societies with a
far-reaching division of labor and specialization.
This pattern remains largely unexplained, but it may be be-
cause the differences between carrots and sticks are still largely
undertheorized.21 There are some contributions in the literature,
but they remain fragmented, exploring narrowly defined
17 Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16 USC § 1531 et seq.
Is See Gordon, 21 J Legal Stud at 455 (cited in note 5).
19 See Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 176-80 (cited in note 4).
20 See Gordon, 21 J Legal Stud at 480-81 (cited in note 5).
21 Note that in the criminological literature, the terms "carrots" and "sticks" are
often used in a different sense than in the present Article: working with carrots stands
for improving the attractiveness of the alternatives to a criminal career, for instance by
increasing education levels, reducing unemployment, or improving social cohesion. See,
for example, Hope Corman and Naci Mocan, Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows, 48 J
L & Econ 235, 237 (2005).
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subquestions. Among the topics considered in papers addressing
specific applications of carrots and sticks are law enforcement
wages,22 the duty to rescue,23 combating corruption,24 and re-
warding whistle-blowers.25
22 See, for example, Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Mal-
feasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J Legal Stud 1, 13-16 (1974). Gary Becker
and George Stigler argue that since the apprehension rate of corrupt officials is very low
and dismissal is the normal sanction (harsher sanctions being very infrequent), law en-
forcement officials should be overpaid so that dismissal becomes more costly to them be-
cause they will lose a well-paying job. Id at 6-11. Note that this form of overpayment is
in fact an annullable carrot in the sense further explained in notes 28 and 48. The idea of
overpaying law enforcement officials is related to a more general principle known as effi-
ciency wages, which we further discuss in note 37.
23 See, for example, Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution
and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 Va L Rev 879, 886-89
(1986). Professor Saul Levmore argues that the traditional approach of the common law
to have no duty to rescue but also to virtually never reward rescuers creates balanced
incentives. Id at 892. He also observes that when sticks are introduced, carrots are often
introduced as well, and argues that this is necessary in order to balance long-term activi-
ty-level incentives. Id at 899. See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Sal-
vors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J Legal Stud 83, 91-92 & n 19, 119-24 (1978) (arguing that legal incentives
could overcrowd social incentives to rescue and hence be detrimental, that carrots may
induce people to invest too much in avoiding risky situations in order not to pay the re-
wards, and that sticks may induce potential rescuers to stay away from locations where
there may be people who need to be rescued).
24 See, for example, Robert Cooter and Nuno Garoupa, The Virtuous Circle of Dis-
trust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes *2-3 (Berkeley Pro-
gram in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series, Nov 2000), online at
http://escholarship.orguc/item/83cOk3wc (visited Mar 3, 2013) (arguing that offering car-
rots to those who report crime induces mistrust between criminals and hence reduces the
incidence of corruption). Our analysis is not restricted to cooperative crimes and is also
valid if individuals do not interact with each other as they do in Professors Robert Cooter
and Nuno Garoupa's framework. Moreover, the analysis of Professors Cooter and Garou-
pa is purely based on incentives and does not consider the other aspects that we bring to
bear on the choice of carrots versus sticks. To make our point stronger, we start from the
assumption that incentives are exactly the same under carrots as under sticks and focus
on other factors (transaction costs, risks, and distribution).
25 See, for example, Ben Depoorter and Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic
Analysis of the False Claims Act, 14 S Ct Econ Rev 135, 137-40 (2006). The authors criti-
cize the use of carrots for private whistle-blowers in fraud cases on account of two factors
that make the private incentives to act diverge from social incentives. First, carrots
make private parties act upon the prospect of a reward while the government looks at
the broader picture of social costs and benefits of prosecuting fraudulent activities. The
reward might be an imperfect proxy for the social value of the prosecution, resulting in
too much or too little prosecution. Id at 154-55. Second, if there is competition among
whistle-blowers and rewards are paid to the first in time, there will be a race to be the
first, which results in premature prosecutions. Id at 158-61. The authors conclude that
both the incentives to blow the whistle and the timing of whistle-blowing will typically
be different from their theoretical optimal values. Id at 161-62. The authors do not com-
pare carrots and sticks in a general setting as we do.
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However, some papers do discuss certain general aspects of
carrots and sticks. For instance, there is some literature about
whether carrots can be rewritten as sticks and vice versa.26
There is also some literature arguing that small sticks can be
sufficient to generate large incentive effects.27 Annullable carrots
and sticks in general, which have very different characteristics
26 See, for example, Katz, 90 Va L Rev at 2228-29 (cited in note 3). Professor Avery
Katz showed that most contracts can be seen as option contracts. For instance, a contract
with a penalty clause for breach could be viewed as an option contract in which the
promisor has two options: perform or pay a predetermined amount. The original contract
can be seen as implementing a stick: damages are a penalty that is due if the promisor
does not perform. In contrast, the option contract can be seen as implementing a carrot
in which the reward corresponds to the amount that the promisor saves if he chooses the
option of performance over the alternative option. Id at 2219-24. Professor Katz con-
cludes that characterizing a contract as a stick contract or a carrot contract depends on
where the baseline is. If the baseline is performance (as in the original contract), then
the payment of the penalty is a stick. If, instead, the baseline is no performance (as in
the option contract), then saving an amount of money equal to the penalty is a carrot. Id
at 2228-29. In Part II, we explain how the ambiguity surrounding the definition of a re-
gime as carrots or sticks can be overcome. See also Lazear, 5 J Econ Persp at 102 (cited
in note 10). Professor Edward Lazear argued that, in the context of employment con-
tracts, a bonus contract can easily be rewritten as a penalty contract by simply changing
the baseline. Id at 103-04. The choice between carrots and sticks may then be influenced
by whether it is easier to set upper or lower limits to performance. In Professor Lazear's
framework, arriving on time at work, for instance, should be incentivized by sticks for
late arrival because an upper limit is appropriate: arriving too early has no value. But
salespersons should be incentivized by carrots because an upper limit (the maximum
quantity that they may be able to sell) cannot be defined. Id. In our analysis, we take
performance to be a discrete, binary variable, so that considerations on upper and lower
limits do not apply.
27 See, for example, Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, 26 J L, Econ, & Org at 366-67
(cited in note 2) (arguing that a single stick can be used to incentivize many people at the
same time when the law enforcer can prevent cooperation among citizens). The reason
sticks have more powerful incentive effects than carrots is that sticks rely on threats,
while carrots rely on actual rewards. If a threat is followed by compliance, the threat-
ened sanction does not need to be applied and can be used to incentivize another individ-
ual. We called this the "multiplication effect" of sticks. Id at 373. An extreme example
would be a world dictator who has only a single bullet and uses it to threaten six billion
citizens to work as his slaves. In contrast, carrots require the actual payment of the
promised reward upon compliance and, hence, cannot be recycled. Id at 367. If individu-
als cannot coordinate, the multiplication effect makes enforcement through sticks much
more powerful than enforcement with carrots because one stick can be used to incentiv-
ize several individuals, while one carrot can be used to incentivize only one individual. If
individuals can coordinate, the multiplication effect disappears. The intuitive reason is
that individuals could agree to share the stick among them and hence reduce the incen-
tive effect to a fraction of the original stick, so that for n coordinated individuals the en-
forcer needs n sticks (not just one). Id at 373-75. Since in most law-enforcement situa-
tions individuals cannot coordinate, it seems plausible to conclude that enforcement is
cheaper with sticks than with carrots. This observation calls for further analysis: If en-
forcement is in principle cheaper with sticks, what justifies the evolution toward a more
widespread use of carrots? In this Article we set out to answer this question.
2013] 349
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than normal carrots and sticks and are rarely used in the real
world, are discussed in a 2009 article we wrote with Professor
Jacques Siegers.28
Other scholars have explored the symmetry between the dif-
ferent legal treatments of positive and negative externalities in
tort law and intellectual property, including Professors Saul
Levmore,29 Wendy Gordon,30 and one of us.31 These papers,
28 Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, and Jacques J. Siegers, Annullable
Bonuses and Penalties, 29 Intl Rev L & Econ 349, 352-55 (2009) (arguing that annulla-
ble bonuses and penalties make sense only under rather exceptional conditions). Annul-
lable sanctions (bonuses or penalties) are sanctions that are applied unless monitoring
takes place. This stands in contrast to normal sanctions, which are applied if monitoring
takes place. Id at 351-53. To illustrate, a speed limit implies that if a motorist is photo-
graphed while speeding, he or she will be subjected to a fine. This is a normal sanction.
The annullable variant of the same sanction is that the motorist must pay the fine un-
less she is photographed while not speeding. What is the difference between these two
regimes? For monitored motorists (those who have been photographed), nothing changes:
those speeding will pay a fine while those driving under the speed limit will not. Instead,
for nonmonitored motorists (those who have not been photographed), the situation
changes. With normal fines, they do not pay the fine, while with annullable fines, they
do pay a fine. Since monitoring is probabilistic, not all motorists are photographed (mon-
itored); actually, only a few are. Thus, applying an annullable sanction rather than a
normal one has consequences for the many nonmonitored individuals and for optimal
law enforcement policy. Id at 352-54. This Article does not touch upon these issues and
only examines normal sanctions, given that annullable sanctions are the exception. For a
discussion of the difference between annullable carrots and sticks and normal carrots
and sticks, see note 48.
29 Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va L Rev 65, 67 (1985) (comparing res-
titution with tort law). Professor Levmore notes that while the law of torts generally
forces compensation for unbargained-for harm, the law of restitution is much more par-
simonious in requiring compensation for unbargained-for benefit. Id at 69-71 ("In short,
the law may be seen as . .. sometimes allowing claims for nonbargained benefits when
the valuation task is easy."). The explanation offered by Professor Levmore focuses es-
sentially on wealth dependency (which makes it difficult to assess the value of a unre-
quested benefit for the recipient, due to the fact that the monetary valuation of benefits
could vary with wealth and preferences) and market encouragement (if unrequested
benefits are not compensated for, those able to benefit others have a choice between do-
ing it for free or negotiating with the recipient; this encourages the formation of markets
and induces people to prefer voluntary transactions to unbargained-for transfers). Id at
74-81. The point of this Article is different, as we do not ask why some forms of positive
externalities are not compensated for but rather whether one should use carrots or sticks
to induce people to behave according to a rule of conduct. In the framework of positive
externalities, our question translates into asking whether (assuming that we want to
induce the production of such externalities) we should reward benefactors or punish
those who fail to benefit others.
30 Gordon, 21 J Legal Stud at 449-52 (cited in note 5) (comparing intellectual prop-
erty law, tort law, and restitution). Professor Gordon notes that
[flrom an abstract perspective, there would seem to be little reason for harms
and benefits to be treated differently. Decades of cost-benefit analyses suggest
that the two categories are interchangeable: reducing by one dollar damage
that would otherwise occur is equivalent to providing a dollar's worth of new
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however, only indirectly reflect on the general differences be-
tween carrots and sticks.
The most extensive literature dealing with a specific context
is the economic literature on the use of taxes versus subsidies to
control pollution.32 This literature largely focuses on the long-
run activity-level effects of carrots and sticks. Subsidizing pollu-
tion-reducing measures by firms, for instance, injects money into
the industry and may attract more polluters in the long run.
One of the general conclusions of this literature, therefore, is
that carrots should be used for positive externalities and sticks
for negative externalities.33 In a recent paper, independently
goods or services. The labels are themselves variable. One can verbally trans-
form most benefit questions into "harms" and vice versa by juggling the base-
line from which effects are measured.
Id at 451. Professor Gordon's analysis focused on whether the traditional arguments of-
fered for the granting of compensation in benefit cases extend to the domain of intellec-
tual property. Id at 460-71. The analysis proposed in this Article is broader in scope and
relies on novel discriminants between carrots and sticks.
31 Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J Legal Stud 21, 22-24 (2009)
(comparing restitution and tort law). Negative liability is the mirror image of positive
tort liability. Under positive tort liability, those causing harm to others are obliged to
pay compensation to the victim; in contrast, under negative liability, those who receive
an unsolicited benefit are obliged to pay compensation to the benefactor. In principle,
these two regimes are perfectly symmetric, as are the problems they address (negative
versus positive externalities). See id. However, there are relevant asymmetries due to
information gathering during trial, incentives for victims and benefactors to behave op-
timally, and the decoupling of care incentives and activity-level incentives. These factors
explain why negative liability is rarely used in the real world and sheds light on the de-
sign of a number of existing negative-liability rules. Id at 26-30. Negative and positive
liability are special examples of carrots and sticks and, in particular, they are analyzed
under the assumption that one instrument (the carrot or the stick) must be used to
achieve two goals at the same time (incentivize the injurer and the victim or the benefac-
tor and the beneficiary; provide incentives for care and incentives for activity level). Id at
33-38. Moreover, the analysis does not touch upon transaction costs, risks, and distribu-
tional issues. Id at 35. In contrast, in the present Article, we focus on cases in which one
instrument is used for only one goal and proceed with an analysis of transaction costs,
risks, and distribution of resources.
32 See, for example, A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 192-96 (Macmillan 4th
ed 1932) (discussing the state's power to mitigate negative externalities by applying
"bounties and taxes"). Arthur Pigou spurred an enormous literature that generally re-
flects on the methods for internalizing negative externalities. For research that relates to
Pigou that more directly addresses the point of an analytical symmetry between differ-
ent methods of internalization, see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L &
Econ 1, 2 (1960). See also note 44.
33 See, for example, Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?,
13 J Legal Stud 57, 61-62 (1984). Professor Donald Wittman was also the first to point
out that transaction costs play a role in the choice between carrots and sticks. For in-
stance, theft should be penalized, rather than nontheft subsidized, because theft occurs
less frequently than its alternative, and therefore sticks involve lower transaction costs.
Id at 65. Professor Wittman attributed the dominance of sticks to the fact that efficient
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from us, Professor Brian Galle34 revives the association between
carrots and positive externalities and sticks and negative exter-
nalities35 and argues that modern societies use carrots excessive-
ly due to political reasons.36
The distinction between carrots and sticks has also received
some attention in other fields of economics, such as (1) labor
economics (for example, the efficiency-wages literature, which
analyzes the characteristics of a special type of annullable bo-
nuses, 7 or the work of Professor Edward Lazear,8 who argued
behavior tends to become "normal" behavior (theft is less frequently occurring than non-
theft because theft is inefficient-and hence, sticks are used for thieves rather than car-
rots for nonthieves). Id at 60 n 11.
34 Galle, 64 Stan L Rev at 801-03 (cited in note 6). Professor Galle analyzes the ef-
fects of carrots and sticks on government revenues (payments to or from the govern-
ment), distribution (but, contrary to us, he does not examine the distributional effects of
different costs of efforts and only focuses on the payments made by or to the govern-
ment), repeated games (that is, the activity-level incentives that are central in the pollu-
tion-tax-versus-subsidy literature), and mitigation. Id at 814-27. Our analysis goes fur-
ther and considers risk, transaction costs, and distributional distortions (which, in our
analysis, also include the different costs of effort). Professor Galle's analysis of mitigation
is based on the implicit assumption that the policymaker uses one instrument (the carrot
or the stick) to solve two problems (for instance, incentivizing an injurer and a victim).
One of us has explained why this may be a more serious problem with carrots than with
sticks; in this Article, we consider situations in which one instrument is used to achieve
one goal. See Dari-Mattiacci, 38 J Legal Stud at 41-42 (cited in note 31).
35 Galle, 64 Stan L Rev at 800 (cited in note 6). But as we will show, this associa-
tion is not at all obvious. The military draft is a very clear example of a positive external-
ity (national defense) accompanied by sticks (penalties for not serving in the army). We
discuss this issue in Part IV.H.
86 Galle, 64 Stan L Rev at 840-45 (cited in note 6). Professor Galle's predictions on
the use of carrots versus sticks in society are static in nature: political incentives induce
policy makers to make excessive use of carrots. Our analysis, instead, accounts for social
and economic changes, as we show that the use of carrots versus sticks is related to some
characteristics (complexity) of the behavior that needs to be incentivized. Therefore, we
are able to explain not only the present use of carrots but also the historical trend to-
ward the present situation.
87 See, for example, Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemploy-
ment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74 Am Econ Rev 433, 437-38 (1984). Professors Carl
Shapiro and Joseph Stiglitz show that overpayment of workers can be an effective incen-
tive device in that overpayment increases the cost of labor and hence creates unemploy-
ment. Unemployment in turn makes the sanction of dismissal more severe for workers
and, hence, improves their incentives to work in situations where the monitoring level is
low. Id. Such an overpayment is called an efficiency wage and is a form of annullable
carrot, as explained in notes 28 and 48. Overpayments are advocated by the authors in
scenarios in which sticks cannot be applied. Therefore, the authors do not offer guidance
for the choice of carrots versus sticks more generally when both are available. See
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 74 Am Econ Rev at 433, 443 (cited in note 37). For other commen-
tary on efficiency wages, see George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Ex-
change, 97 Q J Econ 543, 543-44 (1982); George A. Akerlof, Gift Exchange and Efficien-
cy-Wage Theory: Four Views, 74 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 79, 80-82 (1984)
(arguing that efficiency wages can also be explained with a gift-reciprocity argument:
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that carrots should be used in employment contracts when only
minimum performance can be defined and sticks when only the
maximum performance can be defined), and (2) institutional
economics.3*
The different reactions of human beings (and animals) to
negative and positive sanctions are also widely studied in psy-
chology and behavioral economics. Prospect theory, for instance,
suggests that negative incentives are more effective than posi-
tive incentives because of loss aversion.40 While we do not deny
the importance of psychological aspects, we examine the proper-
ties of carrots and sticks within a narrowly defined, rational
choice framework, in which their apparent equivalence is more
poignant.41 Hence, this Article will not address psychological as-
pects, although we will briefly comment on the general tendency
among psychologists to favor carrots over sticks in Part IV.K.42
Overall, there is a lack of normative guidelines on the use of
carrots and sticks in general, and a lack of explanations of more
general patterns.43 How can we explain that such a fundamental
workers who are overpaid receive a gift and are likely to return the gift to the employer
in the form of more effort even if there is no monitoring at all). This argument relates
more to the behavioral literature on carrots versus sticks than to our framework. See
note 40.
38 Lazear, 5 J Econ Persp at 102 (cited in note 10).
39 See, for example, Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the
Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery 3-11 (Little, Brown 1974) (initiating a
debate on the conditions of slaves and the viability of slavery as a means of production);
Stefano Fenoaltea, Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model, 44 J
Econ Hist 635, 637-43 (1984). See also note 160 and accompanying text.
40 See, for example, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 263-69 (1979) (arguing that the
incentive effect of carrots and sticks is also a function of psychological factors and that
these factors make the result deviate from what would be predicted by traditional eco-
nomic theory); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453, 458 (1981); Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund,
93 Am Econ Rev at 899-901 (cited in note 1) (presenting experimental results on the
joint use of carrots and sticks as compared to using carrots or sticks alone).
41 Behavioral economics and psychology tend to give carrots a larger role than tra-
ditional rational choice framework since they make a stronger point concerning the ad-
vantages of carrots over sticks.
42 For a description of this tendency, see Alfie Kohn, Punished by Rewards: The
Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive Plans, A's, Praise, and Other Bribes 3-4 (Houghton
Mifflin 1993).
43 The analytical symmetry between carrots and sticks is explicitly discussed in
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker's seminal paper on the economics of criminal law. See
Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 191-93 (cited in note 4). But Becker came no further than
suggesting that the more frequent use of sticks in legal systems may be due to historical
coincidences or difficulties in measuring benefits. Id at 208. On the other hand, Professor
Galle concludes that the trend to use more carrots is inefficient and due to distorted
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dimension of norm systems has remained so undertheorized?
Several elements have played a role. One is the difficulty in ob-
jectively defining carrots and sticks, and somewhat related, the
false idea that the difference between carrots and sticks is only
one of framing-much like the difference between a half-full and
a half-empty glass. If the difference between carrots and sticks
is only a perceived one, there is indeed no need to look any fur-
ther for real differences. Note that this framing idea is popular
not only in the psychology literature but also in the economics
literature. Indeed, the economic concept of "opportunity cost"
suggests at first sight that a stick is analytically the same as an
unapplied carrot and vice versa. Also, economists usually focus
on marginal incentives, and the marginal incentives of carrots
and sticks are, in principle, the same.44
Another reason economists have paid so little attention to
the difference between carrots and sticks is that distributional
side effects play a crucial role in the understanding of their dif-
ferences, as we will later show.45 But economists tend to ignore
such effects (partly because they believe that the best way to re-
distribute income is through the tax system46), and this may
have led them to overlook one of the main explanatory variables
in the context of carrots and sticks.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. Defining Carrots and Sticks
While there is some confusion regarding what carrots and
sticks are, defining these terms is surprisingly easy. Carrots and
sticks are both transfers of wealth that induce the citizen to
comply with a rule. A carrot is a payment to the citizen (by the
lawmaker)47 that is made if the citizen has been monitored and
found complying. A stick is a payment by the citizen (to the
political incentives. Galle, 64 Stan L Rev at 840-45 (cited in note 6) (discussing the dis-
torting effects of interest groups and a federal system).
44 The economic idea that carrots and sticks are equivalent with respect to margin-
al incentives is implicit in Ronald Coase's work, although this idea is not presented in
terms of a choice between carrots and sticks. Coase shows that the same result can be
obtained either by having actual polluters pay damages or by paying potential polluters
not to pollute. Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 6 (cited in note 32).
45 See Part II.B.
46 See, for example, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is
Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 667-
69 (1994).
47 "Lawmaker" is broadly defined in this Article. See Part II.B.
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lawmaker) that is made if the citizen has been monitored and
found violating.48
But can carrots and sticks indeed be objectively defined or
are they just the same phenomenon seen from a different angle,
similar to the difference between a half-full and a half-empty
glass? Some authors have made the point that the distinction is
only a matter of framing because carrots can be rewritten as al-
gebraically identical to sticks and vice versa.49 To illustrate, con-
sider a construction contract with a price of $100 and a penalty
for late performance of $9 (applied with probability p = 1). This
contract can be rewritten as one with a price of $91 and a bonus
for timely performance of $9. In both cases the builder receives
$100 if he finishes on time and $91 if he finishes late. Prima fa-
cie, these two regimes seem equivalent.
However, this argument holds only if monitoring is
nonprobabilistic-that is, if it occurs with a probability equal to
1. If the probability of monitoring is less than 1, the payoffs
48 An annullable carrot, in contrast, is a payment that is made unless the citizen
has been monitored and found violating. Similarly, an annullable stick is a payment by
the citizen (to the lawmaker) that is made unless the citizen has been monitored and
found complying. In essence, an annullable carrot is a threat to take back while an an-
nullable stick is a promise to give back. The difference between the normal form and
these annullable variants consists in what happens in the case of no monitoring. In the
absence of monitoring, normal carrots and sticks are not paid, while annullable carrots
and sticks are paid. This implies that when all citizens are monitored (probability p = 1),
the difference between the normal and the annullable variant disappears. See De Geest,
Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers, 29 Intl Rev L & Econ at 349-51 (cited in note 28). Annulla-
ble carrots and sticks are relatively rare. See id at 358. A real-life example of an annul-
lable carrot is an efficiency-wage contract, which pays supra-market wage premiums to
all employees in order to give them an incentive not to shirk. See, for example, Becker
and Stigler, 3 J Legal Stud at 6-11 (cited in note 22) (arguing that increased wages for
enforcers will improve efficiency of fighting corruption); Shapiro and Stiglitz, 74 Am
Econ Rev at 435-38 (cited in note 37) (modeling the efficiency wage at which a worker
will be sufficiently dissuaded from shirking). Efficiency wages are annullable carrots be-
cause all employees receive the overpayment unless they have been found shirking; em-
ployees who have not been monitored (which may include some who have shirked) re-
ceive the bonus as well. Outside of contractual relationships, it is difficult to find
examples of annullable carrots and sticks. An implicit example of an annullable stick is a
penalty for which the burden of proof has been reversed, and the innocent needs some
luck to prove his innocence. See also De Geest, Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers, 29 Intl Rev L
& Econ at 358-59 (cited in note 28).
49 See, for example, Lazear, 5 J Econ Persp at 101-05 (cited in note 10) (arguing
that restrictions on penalty schemes in employment contracts can be circumvented by
rewriting them as bonus schemes); Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics
252-53 (Pearson 4th ed 2004); Katz, 90 Va L Rev at 2200-01 (cited in note 3) (arguing
that the law's refusal to enforce penalty clauses may be evaded in similar ways).
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under carrots and sticks are no longer algebraically identical.50
To illustrate, in the previous construction contract example,
suppose that the citizens can only be monitored in 10 percent of
the cases. The penalty contract with a base price of $100 now
needs a penalty with a magnitude of $90 (because it is applied to
only 10 percent of violators); the bonus contract with a base
price of $91 now needs a bonus of $90 (because it is paid to only
10 percent of the compliers). This means that compliers will re-
ceive $100 under a penalty regime while under a bonus regime,
they will receive either $91 (the base price, in case of no moni-
toring) or $181 (the base price plus the $90 bonus, in case of
monitoring). Under a penalty regime, violators will receive ei-
ther $100 (the base price, in case of no monitoring) or $10 (the
base price minus the $90 sanction, in case of monitoring), while
they will always receive $91 under a bonus regime. While the
payoffs are equal in expected terms,51 they are different in real
terms, and therefore the risk allocation is different (the penalty
contract is risky for breachers while the bonus contract is risky
for performers).52
B. Framework of Our Analysis
Our analysis of carrots and sticks is based on a traditional
rational choice framework, which is commonly used in economic
analysis of law. It is important to repeat that we do not consider
psychological or behavioral effects. This means on the one hand
that our conclusions do not depend on the occurrence of such ef-
fects. But it does mean that our results may need to be qualified
when such effects do occur.
The framework we have in mind is very basic. A lawmaker
exercises some authority (deriving from nature, the law, or the
use of force) over a population of individuals (the citizens) on
whom she enforces a norm (or rule). Complying with this norm
requires some effort from each citizen, but this effort cost may
be different (that is, the lawmaker may require more from some
50 Another condition is that it is possible to pay precompensation, which may be
difficult if the parties are not in a contractual relationship. See De Geest, Dari-Mattiacci,
and Siegers, 29 Intl Rev L & Econ at 352-53 (cited in note 28).
51 To calculate the expected value, one adds the payoffs from each possible outcome
discounted by its probability. So, for example, if a violator has a 10 percent chance of
earning $10 and a 90 percent chance of earning $100, the expected value is: (10)*(0.1) +
(100)*(0.9) = $91.
52 See Gordon, 21 J Legal Stud at 452 (cited in note 5). See also text accompanying
notes 75-76.
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citizens than from others or may require the same but compli-
ance may be more costly for some citizens than for others). To
enforce the norm, the lawmaker has a simple choice: she can use
either sticks or carrots (but not both).
Note that we are using the term "lawmaker" in the broadest
possible sense. It can refer to an international, federal, state, or
local public authority, to a democratic institution or dictator-
ship, or even to a parent, employer, or slave owner who sets the
"rules" for her children, employees, or slaves. (Note that in
terms of principal-agent theory, which is now standard in eco-
nomic analysis of law enforcement,53 the lawmaker is the princi-
pal, and the citizen is the agent.)
Although it is not our intention to develop a formal model,@<
it is important to make our underlying assumptions explicit.
This will make it easier for the reader not only to understand
our arguments but also to discover possible shortcomings of our
analysis. Most of our assumptions are standard in the economic
analysis of law enforcement. For instance, we assume that both
the lawmaker and his citizens are rational, wealth-maximizing
parties;55 we assume that the citizens are fully informed about
the legal rule and that each citizen has what is called a "discrete
choice," which means that she either has to fully comply with
the rule or fully violate it. We also assume that the lawmaker is
not opportunistics (she monitors the citizen with a given proba-
bility and applies the penalty or pays the reward as announced
ex ante; note that even a nonbenevolent lawmaker might find it
advantageous not to behave opportunistically as opportunistic
behavior might affect the credibility of threats and promises in
the future).
Further, we also assume that the citizens are risk averse57
because we want to consider the risk properties of carrots and
sticks.58 We assume that the lawmaker is benevolent;59 that is,
53 See, for example, Kishore Gawande and Alok K. Bohara, Agency Problems in
Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard, 51 Mgmt Sci 1593,
1605-08 (2005).
54 A formal model is available with the authors.
55 See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior,
101 J Polit Econ 385, 385-86 (1993).
56 See Kenneth H. Wathne and Jan B. Heide, Opportunism in Interfirm Relation-
ships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions, 64 J Mktg 36, 37-40 (2000).
57 See, for example, Becker, 76 J Polit Econ at 178 (cited in note 4).
58 For simplicity, we assume that the lawmaker herself is risk neutral. The law-
maker's risk aversion will generally reinforce our results with respect to the risk costs of
carrots and sticks. For instance, if the citizen is not sure whether she will receive a car-
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her purpose is to do what benefits the general welfare and to
achieve rule compliance with the smallest transaction, risk, and
distributional distortion costs (although we will also briefly con-
sider the case of nonbenevolent lawmakers).
Three other simplifying assumptions may be less "innocent"
and may deserve some attention in future research. First, we
assume that carrots are financed through the general tax sys-
tem and that increasing taxes to finance carrots does not in-
crease the transaction costs of the tax system, does not generate
any risk, and does not have any effect on the existing distribu-
tion of resources (the latter, for instance, because they are dis-
tributed equally among all members of society). Similarly, we
assume that the sticks paid by citizens go to the general tax sys-
tem as well and do not have any economic or distributional ef-
fects.60 Second, we assume throughout this Article that all citi-
zens derive the same benefits from the rule (for instance, all
enjoy a clean beach equally).61 Third, we assume that it is not
possible to pay entry fees or any other form of precompensation
to the citizens or the lawmaker. This means, for instance, that
the lawmaker cannot pay a fee ex ante to citizens who will be
subject to a rule that is enforced by a stick. Nor can citizens who
step into a carrot system be made to pay an entry fee to the
lawmaker.62
rot, given less-than-full enforcement, the lawmaker may not be sure whether she will
have to pay carrots as well.
5o See generally Peter T. Leeson, How Much Benevolence Is Benevolent Enough?,
126 Pub Choice 357 (2006).
60 These assumptions are not just made to simplify the model; relaxing them can
significantly change the results. See, for example, note 62. See also Part II.B (discussing
our comments and suggestions for future research). We make these assumptions, first,
because they often correspond to the empirical reality (fines usually go to the treasury
and many rewards and prizes are financed through the general tax system) and, second,
because we want to study carrots and sticks in their "purest" forms, in which their funda-
mental differences are most pronounced. See Galle, 64 Stan L Rev at 802 (cited in note 6).
61 Heterogeneity with respect to benefits may be an argument in favor of carrots to
the extent that a higher contribution can be asked from those who benefit most in order
to finance the carrots. Sticks may artificially change the distribution of wealth by not
obliging those who benefit to pay for this advantage and, a fortiori, by not requiring
those who benefit more to pay accordingly.
62 The assumption of no entry fees is related to another implicit assumption: That
the "participation constraint" of the citizen is satisfied. This is a technical way to say in
essence that the citizen cannot leave the country, or the slave cannot run away. But the
fact that we are making this assumption may have implications for the applicability of
our analysis to contractual settings. It implies that some of the results may change when
we consider, for instance, the relationship between an employer and an employee-
unless we consider contracts that are signed without being read, or contracts that give
authority to the employer to set the internal rules ex post, after the employee has made
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We consider transaction costs, risk costs, and the costs of
distributional distortions. As for transaction costs, a distinction
must be made between monitoring costs, which are incurred ex
ante (before citizens are actually monitored), and processing
costs, which occur ex post (after the citizens have been moni-
tored). Ex ante (monitoring) costs increase with the probability
of monitoring and are the same under the two regimes. Con-
versely, ex post (processing) costs are the costs of actually pay-
ing a carrot or collecting a stick. These include not only payment
costs in a strict sense (for example, the cost of wiring an amount
of money to a bank account) but also the costs of collecting evi-
dence ex post (for instance, taking a photo of a speeding car or
searching for the address of a driver caught speeding), determin-
ing the magnitude of the carrot or the stick (if the magnitude
depends on the severity of the offense), and informing the citizen
that a carrot or a stick will be applied. Processing costs increase
when more citizens actually receive a carrot or pay a stick.
These are the monitored compliers under carrots and the moni-
tored violators under sticks. To clarify, the cost of installing a
speed-monitoring camera near a highway (an ex ante monitoring
cost) is the same whether the camera is intended to detect those
who drive too fast or those who do not. Instead, the cost of tak-
ing actual photographs (an ex post processing cost) depends on
whether the camera takes pictures only of speeding cars or of all
those cars that drive under the speed limit.
Risk costs: Since citizens are usually risk averse, monitoring
levels lower than 100 percent impose a risk-bearing cost on
society.63 Assuming that citizens have similar risk prefer-
ences, good proxies for the risk costs borne by society are
the number of citizens subject to risk (the compliers under
carrots and the violators under sticks) and the magnitude of
the sanctions used.64
Distributional distortion costs: These costs are rarely con-
sidered in economic analysis of law. Yet we will show that
they need to be considered if we want to fully understand
the different uses of carrots and sticks. To see why, it is
significant relation-specific investments. See De Geest, Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers, 29
Intl Rev L & Econ at 352-53 (cited in note 28).
63 See id at 357.
64 That is, we look at how many people a rule exposes to risk and how big these
risks are.
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important to bear in mind that the purpose of a penalty or
reward is to incentivize citizens to comply with a rule. The
purpose of a penalty or reward is not to change the distribu-
tion of wealth in society. However, under some conditions
the effect of a penalty or reward may be that some citizens
become poorer or wealthier than others.
To illustrate the latter, consider first a stick regime that re-
quires all one thousand beach visitors to throw their litter into
one of the beach's trash cans. This corresponds to an effort cost
of $2, but every visitor receives an in-kind compensation of $3
that consists of enjoying a cleaner beach, if there are enough vis-
itors. Each visitor is in a typical free-rider situation: he could lit-
ter and yet enjoy a relatively clean beach if all other visitors
cleaned up after themselves.65 In this case, the stick-enforced
duty to keep the beach clean does not change the distribution
among the beach visitors. But now change the example and sup-
pose that the most efficient way to keep the beach clean is to re-
quire one visitor to clean full-time (an effort of $1,000) while all
others do nothing. If the full-time worker were incentivized
through a stick, he would be substantially impoverished by the
rule. But the goal of the duty to keep the beach clean was to
keep the beach clean, not to change the existing wealth distribu-
tion. The distributional distortion can be prevented by using a
carrot system instead, incentivizing the worker through a carrot
of $1,000 (financed through the general tax system).66
Why should we be concerned with the distributional side ef-
fects of carrots and sticks? Such distributional distortions are
socially costly for three reasons. First, if the existing distribution
of wealth in society were optimal, carrots and sticks might di-
rectly reduce social welfare by altering what was already optimal.
Second, distributional distortions might alter ex ante activity-level
66 Each visitor bears the full costs of his effort in keeping the beach clean but enjoys
only a portion of the benefits created by his effort since these benefits are shared with
other visitors. In economics parlance, this is a situation characterized by positive exter-
nalities. Economic theory predicts that effort (in keeping the beach clean) will be under-
supplied, unless the lawmaker intervenes. See V.V. Chari and Larry E. Jones, A Recon-
sideration of the Problem of Social Cost: Free Riders and Monopolists, 16 Econ Theory 1,
1-5 (2000).
66 At first sight, it may appear as if the $1,000 made the worker $1,000 richer; yet,
this is only so in a narrow bookkeeping sense, and not in a real economic sense, because
the worker had to exert an effort cost that she valued at $1,000. So in this very example,
the worker was indifferent to receiving the $1,000 job.
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incentives.67 (And in this respect our analysis of distributional
distortions also captures some of the long-run effects of carrots
and sticks.) Third, in a dynamic society in which legal rules of-
ten change, distributional distortions also create risk since fu-
ture rules may impoverish some citizens and enrich others in
unpredictable ways. 68
C. Seven Fundamental Differences between Carrots and Sticks
From the definition of carrots and sticks, we can derive
some fundamental differences between the two concepts. We do
this for two reasons. First, we want to attain a more general and
fundamental understanding of their differences than does the
previous literature. Second, we will use these differences as
building blocks for our argument in the rest of this Article.
1. Difference 1: A carrot is applied upon compliance; a stick
upon violation.
This follows from the direction of the transfer (to or from the
citizen) under carrots and sticks and their common purpose (in-
centivizing the citizen to comply). Doing otherwise-that is, ap-
plying a carrot upon violation or a stick upon compliance-would
create incentives to violate the rule, which is not the lawmaker's
aim. Note that while carrots and sticks seem to be each other's
mirror images, this symmetry is not perfect since compliance is
the "normal" state-that is, the state that the lawmaker tries to
reach. To what extent the lawmaker will succeed in obtaining
compliance will depend on her information about the citizens' ef-
fort costs as discussed below.69
2. Difference 2: Carrots incentivize by effectively rewarding
while sticks incentivize only by threatening.
This follows immediately from the previous difference: when
the goal (compliance) is obtained, the stick is not applied. A cor-
ollary is that a carrot is used up upon compliance while a stick is
used up upon violation. When a reward has been paid to a com-
plying citizen, the same amount of money cannot be used again
67 See Wittman, 13 J Legal Stud at 68 (cited in note 33).
68 For an application of this point in a different context, see Steven Shavell, Specific
Performance versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 Tex L
Rev 831, 832-33 (2006).
69 See Part II.F.
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to incentivize the citizen to comply with another rule (in other
words, there is exhaustion of the lawmaker's budget). In con-
trast, when a threat is not executed, the same threat can gener-
ally be repeated.70
3. Difference 3: Carrots generate (ex post) transaction costs
in case of compliance; sticks in case of violation.
The transaction costs we consider here are ex post pro-
cessing costs, that is, the costs of transferring money when pay-
ing a carrot or collecting a stick. Difference 3 follows directly
from Difference 1: in the case of sticks, these costs occur when
the citizen is found shirking; in the case of carrots, the costs ac-
crue when the citizen is found complying.71 As a result, carrots
are more expensive in terms of transaction costs when the ma-
jority follows the rules.72 In contrast, there is no difference be-
tween carrots and sticks with respect to ex ante monitoring costs,
since these costs are made ex ante, irrespective of whether the
monitored individual is a complier or a violator and, hence, irre-
spective of whether enforcement is based on carrots or sticks.
Moreover, monitoring will in principle be set at the same level
under carrots and sticks.73
4. Difference 4: Under carrots, all nonmonitored citizens
receive the same treatment as monitored violators;
under sticks, all nonmonitored citizens receive the same
treatment as monitored compliers.
If monitoring occurs with a probability less than 1, some cit-
izens will not be monitored and hence will forego the carrot or
avoid the stick irrespective of their behavior. Under carrots,
nonmonitored citizens and monitored violators do not receive a
carrot while monitored compliers do receive a carrot. Under
70 See Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, 26 J L, Econ, & Org at 366 (cited in note 2):
This peculiar characteristic of sticks is grounded in the fact that if the agent
complies, the threat to punish does not need to be carried out and hence can be
used again to incentivize the same or another agent. In contrast, a reward has
to be paid to a complying agent and hence it is consumed at every use and can-
not be recycled.
71 Note that a reversal of the burden of proof may affect some of these differences
with respect to procedural costs. This will not be further examined in this Article.
72 See Wittman, 13 J Legal Stud at 65 n 25 (cited in note 33).
73 Monitoring levels may differ when the stick cannot be set as high as the carrot
because of the citizens' wealth constraints (or those of the lawmaker) or when carrots
need to be set higher because money has a decreasing marginal utility for the citizen.
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sticks, nonmonitored citizens and monitored compliers pay no
stick while monitored violators do pay a stick. This characteris-
tic could also serve as the basis for a test to determine whether a
regime is a normal carrot or normal stick regime.74
5. Difference 5: Carrots create risks for compliers; sticks
create risks for violators.
This difference (which follows directly from the previous
one) shows that carrots have an undesirable property: they cre-
ate risks for the "good" citizens (the compliers) while sticks cre-
ate risks for the "bad" citizens (the violators). In the basic
framework of Part II.B (in which there is full compliance), sticks
create no risks at all.75 Instead, carrots create risks for all citi-
zens because, when there is full compliance, all citizens receive a
probabilistic reward76
6. Difference 6: Only carrots have a built-in compensation
mechanism.
Carrots do two things: they give citizens an incentive to in-
cur some effort cost and they fully compensate citizens for this
effort cost. The reason is that, in order to make a citizen exert
effort, the carrot must be at least as large as the cost of the ef-
fort. Since carrots are applied upon compliance, the citizen is
compensated for his effort.
74 Such a test based on the treatment of nonmonitored citizens would not allow dis-
tinguishing between normal carrots and annullable sticks or between normal sticks and
annullable carrots (this would also require an analysis of the distributional effects). See
notes 28, 48 and accompanying text.
75 We do not consider the risks for the lawmaker (who may have to finance the car-
rots or may receive the fines paid by violators) in this Article. The conclusions will gen-
erally point in the same direction because more risk for the citizen means more risk for
the lawmaker. Risk may not be an issue for some lawmakers who are risk neutral (for
example, a state or some large corporations). See Joshua Graff Zivin, Richard E. Just,
and David Zilberman, Risk Aversion, Liability Rules, and Safety, 25 Intl Rev L & Econ
604, 608 (2005).
76 There are subtle differences here between carrots and sticks in that carrots give
complying citizens an incentive to increase the probability of monitoring. For instance,
an inventor has an incentive to apply for a patent so that her good behavior is discovered
by the legal system. Nonetheless, even carrots that are not meant to be probabilistic are
often de facto probabilistic. For instance, an inventor may need some luck to find the
right party to commercialize his invention, and a composer of a great song may need
some luck to find the right singer to perform it. So, even if the good behavior leads with
certainty to the legal carrot, it leads only in a probabilistic way to the financial carrot
that the legal system intends to create. See also notes 82, 85 and accompanying text.
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However, this does not hold for sticks. Here, the complying
citizen is made worse off (she exerts effort and receives no direct
compensation for it), unless she receives sufficient indirect com-
pensation in the form of benefits from the compliance of other
citizens. Consider again the duty to keep the beach clean exam-
ple. If all one thousand beach visitors must each spend $2 to
clean the beach but they all receive a benefit of $3 in the value of
a cleaner beach, nobody is worse off, resulting in a win-win situ-
ation. But if the rule states that the work must be done by a sin-
gle citizen who has to work full-time and incur a cost of $1,000
in order to avoid a stick, this citizen is made worse off by the
rule.77
Enforcement with sticks can make citizens worse off while
enforcement with carrots cannot. In a sense, labor becomes free
for the lawmaker with sticks while labor must be purchased
with carrots. Carrots are therefore "harmless"; their built-in
compensation mechanism serves also as a built-in exploitation
protection and a built-in labor waste protection. Legal systems
may forbid using sticks for a reason that is analogous to the rea-
son why they forbid takings without compensation: such re-
strictions improve the incentives to choose optimal rules.78
Another way to interpret this result is as follows. When the
lawmaker uses carrots, she can use them only to introduce a
rule. When the lawmaker gets a stick, she can use it to introduce
a rule but also to steal. Carrots and sticks can be used in pro-
ductive ways, but only sticks can be abused.79
77 See text accompanying note 66.
78 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings
Compensation, 96 Va L Rev 1673, 1675 (2010).
79 Could we say that a rule with a carrot is an invitation to act while a rule with a
stick is an order to act? This popular belief seems to have been shared by Jeremy Ben-
tham, who argued that sticks have a "coercive" influence while carrots have only an "al-
luring" influence. See H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Powers, 81 Yale L J 799, 805
(1972). Similarly, in his distinction between (softer and continuous) "prices" and (harder
and noncontinuous) "sanctions," Professor Cooter mentioned a carrot (subsidies) only as
a "price." Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum L Rev 1523, 1532-37 (1984).
Carrots may be discontinuous, too, and may remove any option to violate by being suffi-
ciently high (like when a bid is so high that it "cannot be resisted). See id at 1531. Is it
more respectful to incentivize human beings with carrots than with sticks? Is compliance
under carrots more "voluntary" than compliance under sticks? This viewpoint is incor-
rect in the sense that both carrots and sticks create some pressure on individuals. How-
ever, the viewpoint is correct to the extent that carrots have a built-in participation con-
straint: The citizen who chooses to violate remains at his status quo position. Carrots
allow violating citizens to preserve the status quo.
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This has important implications when the lawmaker dele-
gates the decision to a lawmaker at a lower level (for example, a
legal institution at a more decentralized level, or more broadly a
parent who can set the rules for her children, or an employer
who can set the rules for her employees).80 When there is a dan-
ger that the right to use sticks will be abused, sticks may be for-
bidden or heavily regulated.
7. Difference 7: Individualized and general carrots have
different distributional effects for compliers while
individualized and general sticks have the same
distributional effects for compliers.
Sticks are not applied upon compliance. Therefore, their
magnitude has no effect on these citizens' wealth. Carrots, in
contrast, are applied upon compliance, and therefore their mag-
nitude matters. To illustrate, consider a group of citizens whose
effort costs are uniformly distributed between $1 and $10. A
general stick has to be equal for all citizens-its expected value
must be $10 in this example because it must be at least as high
as the highest effort cost of a citizen. Individualized sticks, on
the other hand, can be set at different levels for different indi-
viduals-for instance, for a citizen with an effort cost of $1, the
stick's expected value can be $1. The distributional effects of
general and individualized sticks are the same when all citizens
comply because sticks are not applied and hence their magni-
tude makes no difference. A citizen with an effort cost of $1 will
be impoverished by $1 while a citizen with an effort cost of $10
will be impoverished by $10-the impoverishment of complying
citizens always equals their effort cost and is not related to the
magnitude of the sticks (as long as the sticks are high enough to
induce compliance).81
The situation is different for carrots. Since carrots are paid
upon compliance, their magnitude does matter. Individualized
carrots may even completely prevent the distributional changes
among citizens when they are set equal to the individual effort
costs. Note further that a general carrot (for instance, $10 for all
80 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 308-10 (1976).
81 For simplicity we assume in this illustration that citizens do not benefit from the
rule compliance of others. Relaxing this assumption would not change the distributional
differences within the group of citizens (though it may change the distributional distor-
tions compared to outsiders).
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citizens) has similar distributional effects within the group of
citizens as sticks: the citizens with the higher effort costs benefit
less than those with the lower effort costs.
D. The Easy Case for Sticks: Homogeneous Society with a
Fully Informed Benevolent Lawmaker
We start by analyzing the simple case in which all citizens
are identical with respect to the required effort cost (note that
we also assume throughout this Article that citizens derive ben-
efits from rule compliance by all others). Furthermore, we as-
sume that the lawmaker is fully informed about the effort costs
of her citizens.
Because the lawmaker is fully informed, she is able to set
the values of the expected carrots and sticks at a level high
enough that all citizens comply. From Difference 1, we know
that sticks will never be applied because a threat is sufficient to
induce compliance (Difference 2). By contrast, carrots will have
to be paid to all citizens (with the probability announced ex
ante), since they will all comply. This simple fact leads to the fol-
lowing consequences:
Transaction costs: Carrots generate at least the same (ex
ante) monitoring costs as sticks. Moreover, sticks will gen-
erate no (ex post) processing costs (Difference 3) because no
citizen violates the rule. Instead, carrots will generate
enormous processing costs, since all citizens comply and
those who are monitored need to be rewarded. In sum, car-
rots generate more transaction costs than sticks.
Risk: Sticks generate no risk (Difference 5), even if monitor-
ing occurs with a probability less than 1 because all citizens
comply, and those who are monitored are never punished
and hence are treated in the same way as those who are not
monitored (Difference 4). Instead, under carrots, all comply-
ing citizens (that is, all individuals) are subject to the risk of
either being monitored and rewarded or not being moni-
tored but bearing the effort cost anyway.82
82 Note that if the monitoring probability is equal to 100 percent there is no differ-
ence between carrots and sticks with respect to risk because in this case all complying
citizens receive a carrot, and therefore carrots no longer generate risks for compliers.
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Distributional distortion costs: Sticks are also neutral with
respect to distribution: all individuals bear the same effort
cost and no one is punished. This means that everyone is
equally better off (at least if we assume that all citizens re-
ceive the same benefit from others' compliance with the
rule).83 Thus, sticks treat each individual in the same way.
In contrast, carrots make all monitored citizens richer (they
receive a carrot and a share in the benefit) than all nonmon-
itored citizens (who only receive a share in the benefit).
Thus, carrots create some distributional distortion while
sticks do not distort. We will call this effect the lottery effect
of carrots because compliers are forced to participate in a
virtual lottery. The winners-those who are lucky enough to
be monitored-are overcompensated; the losers-those who
have exerted effort but who are not monitored-are under-
compensated. To illustrate, suppose that each citizen makes
an effort of $2 and has a 10 percent chance of being moni-
tored and receiving a carrot of $30. Those who are lucky
enough to be monitored-that is, those who win the virtual
carrot lottery-become $28 richer in the end. The others be-
come $2 poorer.84
E. The Case for Carrots: Citizens Have Different Effort Costs
Here we consider the case in which the lawmaker is fully in-
formed but the costs of each citizen's effort vary. For instance,
the lawmaker may want all citizens to give up some land for a
new highway project, but some landowners must only give up 10
square feet while others must sacrifice a 100-acre farm. Or the
lawmaker may want all boats that are in the vicinity of a sink-
ing ship to help rescue its cargo, but some boats can do so more
83 This is an assumption that we make for simplicity; if benefits are clearly une-
qual, this creates an argument in favor of carrots, which allow the legal system to charge
a higher carrot tax from high-value users. The assumption of equal benefits is plausible
in many circumstances though; for instance, citizens benefit more or less equally from a
crime-free or litter-free environment. See Charles J. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: Intersec-
tions of Land Use Regulation, Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 Ga St U L
Rev 789, 799-800 (2012). Note also that the benefit received by each citizen must be
greater than the effort she makes. This is because the lawmaker is benevolent and hence
the total effort cost must be less than the collective benefit.
S4 The outcome becomes more complicated when we also consider the fact that
nonmonitored citizens may receive a benefit from compliance by the others but at the
same time must also pay their portion of the taxes to finance the carrots. But it is clear
that there still may be cases in which carrots make nonmonitored citizens worse off.
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easily than others (because they have better equipment or
greater storage capacity).
Transaction costs: The lawmaker can set the sticks or car-
rots high enough so that all citizens will comply. Since they
all comply, sticks do not have to be applied, thus generating
no transaction costs (in the sense of ex post processing
costs). Carrots, however, must be paid to the citizens (or at
least to some of them, if monitoring is probabilistic). Thus,
sticks still generate fewer transaction costs than carrots.
Risk: Sticks generate no risk because all citizens comply
and therefore face no risk of punishment. Under carrots, all
(complying) citizens bear some risk-at least if they are
paid probabilistically.85 Thus, carrots generate more risk
than sticks.
Distributional distortion costs: Both sticks and carrots may
distort existing distributions of wealth. Sticks may impover-
ish citizens with large effort costs relative to citizens with
small (or even zero) effort costs. Meanwhile, carrots may
both enrich monitored citizens, whose effort is more than
compensated by the carrot while also potentially impover-
ishing nonmonitored citizens, whose effort is not directly
compensated by the carrot. In fact, the efforts of nonmoni-
tored citizens could be larger than their share in the collec-
tive benefit (after deduction of the carrot tax they paid).
Moreover, general carrots (which pay the same amount to
all complying citizens, irrespective of their effort costs) may
also overcompensate in expected terms, by paying the same
amount to all citizens irrespective of their effort costs.
Therefore, citizens with small effort costs may be enriched
relative to citizens with high effort costs. Carrots may dis-
tort by overpaying; sticks by underpaying. As a result, gen-
eral carrots will distort more than general sticks in some
cases and less in other cases.
85 Even carrots that are not meant to be paid probabilistically can in fact be proba-
bilistic. One reason is that some citizens may not be able to come up with sufficient evi-
dence of their acts. Another is that carrots may have winner-take-all properties. For in-
stance, an inventor may not receive a patent if someone else applies for the same patent
one day earlier.
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To illustrate with a numerical example, suppose that ninety
citizens have an effort cost of $100 while the other ten citizens
have an effort cost of $10. Both a general carrot and a general
stick will need to be set at $100 in order to induce all citizens to
comply. The general carrot will overpay ten citizens by $90 each,
bringing the total amount of overpayment at $900. The general
stick will underpay those ten citizens by $10 each, but it will al-
so underpay the other ninety by $100 each. This brings the total
underpayment to $9,100. Therefore, sticks distort the existing
distribution more. But the opposite can hold true in other exam-
ples, if there are more citizens with relatively low effort costs
(for instance when ninety citizens have an effort cost of $10, and
ten have an effort cost of $100).
Yet, the advantage of carrots is that their amounts can be
individualized. Individualized carrots can, in theory, remove the
unequal effort effect by rewarding each citizen according to the
cost of his effort. This cannot be accomplished by using individ-
ualized sticks (Difference 7). The reason is simple: sticks are ap-
plied to violators (Difference 1) and therefore, by individualizing
sticks, it is possible to create differences among violators but not
among compliers (because they exert effort but the stick is not
applied). Additionally, with carrots, the distortion between the
group of citizens and a group of outsiders can be corrected by fi-
nancing carrots through taxes applied principally to outsiders.86
Using sticks, however, outsiders free ride on the efforts of the
citizens, who are obliged to work for free. With carrots, this free-
rider effect may be reduced when the outsiders pay their part of
the taxes, which are needed to finance the carrots for the citi-
zens.
In sum, if different efforts are asked from individual citi-
zens, but the lawmaker is fully informed about these effort costs,
sticks generate fewer transaction and risk costs than carrots but
may in some cases generate greater distributional distortion
costs than carrots. But overall, this means that sticks are no
longer intrinsically superior. If the distributional distortions are
significant (so that some individuals are really "singled out"),
carrots are superior.
86 For example, the Nobel Peace Prize is funded by "gifts, awards, and bequests."
History of Organization (Nobel Prize), online at http://www.nobelprize.orglnobel-prizes/
peace/laureates/1904/international-law-history.html (visited Mar 3, 2013).
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F. Another Case for Carrots: The Lawmaker Has No
Information on the Citizens' Individual Effort Costs
If the lawmaker does not know the individual effort costs of
citizens, she also may not know which citizens are able to com-
ply with a norm at reasonable costs. As a result, a stick regime
may sanction citizens who are simply unable to comply. For in-
stance, if the legal system used a stick system to create incen-
tives for citizens to compose songs, those who lacked musical
talent might be punished.87 The greater the proportion of citi-
zens who are unable to comply, the greater the transaction costs,
risk costs, and distributional side effects generated by sticks.
To illustrate, suppose that one hundred citizens out of a
province with a population of one million have valuable infor-
mation about a criminal organization. The provincial govern-
ment, however, does not know who these one hundred people
are. Suppose that all one hundred potential compliers have iden-
tical effort costs of $1 million (including protection costs). Incen-
tives can be created either by offering a $1 million reward to
those who divulge the information or by giving all one million
citizens of the province a $1 million fine, except for those who of-
fer the information. While fines create identical incentives, they
generate higher transaction costs and distort the existing distri-
bution by impoverishing the one million citizens of that province
compared to the rest of the country.88 To the extent that fines
are probabilistic, they also create risk.
The opposite is also possible-that some citizens are unable
to violate the rule because they lack either the technical skills
(for example, hacking) or the opportunity to do so (for example,
corruption and insider trading). While inability to comply weak-
ens the case for sticks, inability to violate weakens the case for
carrots because carrots may reward citizens without merit. Pay-
ing a carrot for abstaining from hacking to someone who is not a
computer expert does not improve her incentives while it
87 See Part III.B and Part IV.A.
88 Note that in this example, not only are the citizens who possess no information
impoverished by $1 million but so are those one hundred who possess the information
because the latter have an effort cost of $1 million. The distortion is substantially larger
than a stick that would only target the one hundred, though. Moreover, carrots do not
distort in this example because they are only paid to the one hundred who offer the in-
formation and who receive a carrot that corresponds to this effort cost.
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increases transaction costs, creates risk (if rewarding is done in
a probabilistic way), and creates distributional distortions (by
artificially enriching some citizens who did not incur any effort
cost). The higher the proportion of citizens who are unable to vi-
olate, the greater these transaction costs, risk costs, and distri-
butional distortions associated with carrots will be.
Transaction costs: Let's assume that the lawmaker makes
the carrot or stick large enough so that all citizens who can
comply with the rule at reasonable costs will comply-in
other words, all who are able to comply do so and all who
are unable to comply violate. Sticks will be applied more of-
ten than carrots if there are more violators than compliers.
To put it differently, sticks lose their intrinsic transaction
costs advantage if the majority of the citizens are unable to
comply with the rule.89
Risk: By the same token, sticks begin to generate more risks
than carrots if there are more violators than compliers. For
instance, under sticks, all those who are unable to compose
a song would live in fear that they might be singled out for
monitoring and receive a penalty.
Distributional distortion costs: Distortions must derive from
the fact that some individuals have larger effort costs than
others or from the fact that some citizens are monitored
while others are not.90 With respect to the latter, sticks now
generate a lottery effect as well because some individuals
who are unable to comply will be punished. The lottery ef-
fect of carrots will also increase to the extent that the rule is
applied to citizens who are unable to violate. Note that nei-
ther the lottery-effect distortions nor the distortions due to
heterogeneity can be corrected by individualizing the carrot
or the stick when the lawmaker does not know the individ-
uals' effort costs (which is the case we are analyzing in this
Section).
In sum, the choice between carrots and sticks should depend
on several factors, including the degree of heterogeneity of the
citizens and the seriousness of the risk that is created by the
89 See Wittman, 13 J Legal Stud at 65-66 (cited in note 33).
90 We do not consider distributional side effects that are caused by different bene-
fits. Heterogeneous benefits generally make the case for carrots stronger.
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probabilistic nature of enforcement. But overall, carrots will
tend to be preferable to sticks when there are few citizens who
are able to comply with a norm.
III. NORMATIVE GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF
CARROTS AND STICKS
A. In Simple Settings, Sticks Are Superior
How should these results be interpreted? A first normative
guideline is that in simple settings, sticks are superior because
they are not meant to be applied, thus minimizing transaction
costs and risks. In addition, sticks cause fewer distributional
distortions when the citizens are sufficiently homogenous with
respect to effort costs. This simple result explains why legal sys-
tems usually rely on sticks (as is clearly the case with criminal
law and tort law) and why carrots (such as copyrights and pa-
tents) are the exception.
But sticks may lose some of their intrinsic comparative ad-
vantages when citizens are heterogeneous with respect to effort
costs (because sticks may, in those cases, seriously impoverish
some citizens). Moreover, heterogeneity in effort costs will often
be accompanied by the lawmaker's incomplete information about
individual effort costs, so that the lawmaker may have difficul-
ties in determining what level of effort to demand from whom.
In those cases, sticks may punish citizens who are unable to
comply with the rule at reasonable costs; because sticks are ap-
plied in those cases, they generate transaction costs and risk
costs.
B. Carrots in the Case of Specification Problems: The
Lawmaker Does Not Know What to Ask from Each Citizen
Heterogeneity can be translated into two more specific con-
ditions under which carrots are more likely optimal (and more
likely to be used). First, it is more probable that carrots will be
used when there are specification problems, when it is not clear
who should do exactly what. Who should invent, compose, res-
cue, search for lost property, or discover valuable old paintings?
Which employee should generate suggestions for improving the
production process? And what exactly should be invented, com-
posed, or rescued? What sport or how much exercise is optimal
for an individual? If any of these is unclear, then the legal sys-
tem may use carrots.
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Why are carrots increasingly used in the case of specifica-
tion problems? In essence, this is because a sticks regime would
have to be overbroad (both in terms of the citizens from whom it
requires an effort and the tasks it requires from the citizens).
For instance, if incentives to compose songs were to be created
through sticks, many individuals who are unable to compose
would be sanctioned (since the legal system does not know who
is able to compose), and those who are able would still be sanc-
tioned if they composed fewer great songs than Paul McCartney
or even Mozart (since the legal system does not know how many
great songs a talented composer is able to compose). Moreover,
most great composers would have to be sanctioned for not com-
posing new types of music (since the legal system does not know
which composers are able to create truly novel types of music).
C. Carrots in the Case of Singling-Out Problems: The
Lawmaker Needs to Ask for Substantially Higher Efforts
from Some Citizens
The second instance in which carrots are more likely to be
optimal is when there is a singling-out danger, which is the case
when rules are less general and more individualized (when high
efforts are required from some individuals but not others). This
explains why those who work full-time for the government re-
ceive a carrot in the form of a wage and those whose property is
taken for a highway project receive compensation. But note that
the magnitude of the individual effort cost itself is not sufficient
for the singling-out danger; unequal treatment of individuals (or
families) is also required. For instance, if the law requires all
males to serve in the army, the law requires large effort costs,
but because all families contribute more or less equally, there
are no significant distributional distortions.
IV. APPLICATIONS
In the following sections we apply these results to a variety
of cases. We will show that in each of these cases the use of car-
rots can be explained by specification problems or singling-out
problems.
A. Patents and Copyrights
Patents and copyrights are the most obvious examples of
carrots created by the law. Successful inventors and composers
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receive a carrot in the form of the profits associated with the
ownership of exclusive rights.91
The use of patents and copyrights is consistent with the re-
sults of our analysis. First, specification problems are enormous
for these types of activities. Who in our society is in the best po-
sition to invent or compose? What should be invented or which
songs should be composed? What exactly should individuals do
to invent or compose more productively?
Second, stick regimes may lead to singling-out problems.
Why do we not use a stick regime to oblige individuals who have
proven that they can compose efficiently (such as Paul McCart-
ney) to compose more songs (using the fact that after the first
successful composition an important part of the specification
problem is solved)? This method would single out an individual
to exert a significant effort without compensation, and the sin-
gling-out effect would lead to many distortions, both directly
(distorting the existing distribution) and indirectly (for instance
in the form of activity-level distortions, that is, the decisions to
become a composer in the first place).
B. Rescuers
The incentives to rescue are largely created through car-
rots-both nonmonetary (nonlegal carrots such as medals) and
monetary (as in admiralty law for the rescue of cargo).92 Never-
theless, many foreign legal systems (and a few American states)
use sticks (that is, a duty to rescue supported by a sanction for
failure to rescue) for simple forms of rescue. 93
Such a duty to rescue is never imposed for complex, risky, or
costly forms of rescue; indeed, it only concerns simple forms of
rescue, in which it is clear what should be done and who should
do it (that is, no specification costs). Examples include throwing
a rope to a drowning swimmer, calling a doctor or an emergency
service, or informing the police of an ongoing criminal activity.94
Moreover, there is only such a duty when the effort costs (includ-
ing safety risks for the rescuer) are relatively small and homo-
geneous across the population, so that there is no singling-out
problem (that is, there are no significant distributional distortions).
91 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8; Troy Paredes, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Ty-
ing: Will Courts Stop Misusing Misuse?, 9 High Tech L J 271, 273 (1994).
92 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 896, 909 (cited in note 23).
93 See, for example, French Penal Code § 223-6(2); notes 95 and 96.
94 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 883 (cited in note 23).
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This is clearly so in civil law countries (which have a tradition of
duties to rescue),95 but it holds as well for the few American states
that have recently introduced statutory duties to rescue.96
While there is no general duty to rescue under the common
law,97 courts have imposed a duty to rescue in an increasing
number of situations in which a "special relationship" exists be-
tween potential rescuer and victim. Some of these special rela-
tionships are contractual relationships98--for example, the duty
of railroad companies to take care of ill passengers -but others
cannot be explained as implied contract terms-for example, the
duty of an innkeeper to protect strangers from injury by a
guest.99 Professor Levmore observes that all these cases contain
95 The German Criminal Code provides a criminal sanction for one who does not
help someone in need if it "can be expected of him under the circumstances, particularly
if it is possible without substantial danger to himself and without violation of other im-
portant duties." German Crim Code § 323(c), as translated in The German Criminal
Code: A Modern English Translation 200 (Hart 2008) (Michael Bohlander, trans). The
French Penal Code provides a criminal sanction for any person who abstains from "ren-
dering assistance to a person in peril when he or she could have rendered that assistance
without risk to himself." French Penal Code § 223-6(2), as translated in The French Pe-
nal Code of 1994 as Amended as of January 1, 1999 120 (Rothman 1999) (Edward A.
Tomlinson, trans). The statute does not apply to property-which makes sense because
rescuing a person is a no-brainer while for property there are usually specification prob-
lems as to who should rescue what.
96 In Vermont, Hawaii, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, there is a statuto-
ry duty to rescue when such rescue is riskless. 12 Vt Stat Ann § 519(a):
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to
the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable as-
sistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided
by others.
Hawaii Rev Stat § 663-1.6; Minn Stat Ann § 604A.01; RI Gen Laws § 11-56-1; Wis Stat
§ 940.34(2)(a). In Massachusetts there is a statutory duty to report a crime when report-
ing creates no danger. Mass Ann Laws ch 268, § 40. Washington requires reporting cer-
tain violent offenses and certain offenses against children. Wash Rev Code Ann
§ 9.69.100. Ohio requires reporting felonies. Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2921.22. Florida re-
quires reporting sexual battery. Fla Stat Ann § 794.027. In California, there is a duty to
report certain crimes against minors. Cal Penal Code § 152.3.
97 See Jackson v City of Joliet, 715 F2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir 1983).
98 See Christopher T. Wonnell, Unjust Enrichment and Quasi-Contracts, in Gerrit
De Geest, ed, 6 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Contract Law and Economics 454,
459 (Edward Elgar 2d ed 2011); Landes and Posner, 7 J Legal Stud at 125 (cited in note
23). See also W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56 at 376-
77 (West 5th ed 1984) (describing the duties of innkeepers toward their guests, of em-
ployers toward their employees, and of schools toward their students).
99 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 899 (cited in note 23). Similar duties include the
duty of hospitals to help unconscious patients in emergency situations, the duty of prison
officers to protect prisoners against violence from other inmates, the duty of psycholo-
gists to warn strangers of their patient's criminal plans, the duty of parole boards to pro-
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three elements: "First, there is a single nonrescuer. Second, this
nonrescuer could with little effort have prevented a serious loss.
Third, this nonrescuer had no reason to think that someone else
would save the day."oo Professor Levmore's first and third points
are related to what we have modeled as complete information:
both the lawmaker (the government or the court) and the citizen
(the rescuer) can easily identify the optimal rescuer (that is, no
specification problems).o1 Professor Levmore's second point re-
lates to the fact that there are no significant distributional dis-
tortions (that is, no singling-out problem).
Instead, risky, costly, and complex rescue activities are ei-
ther provided by paid special services (for example, firefighters
or alpine rescue teams) or rewarded with other types of carrots
(prizes, or restitution for the costs incurred, or nonlegal carrots
such as esteem). For instance, under admiralty law, a relatively
generous carrot is awarded to rescuers for successfully salvaging
property from a sinking ship.102 This is again in line with our re-
sults because here there are serious specification problems as to
who should rescue f all the ships that are in the area, which
one is in the best position to rescue? And as to what should be
rescued-if it is not possible to save all goods, which ones should
be saved? The latter may depend not only on the value of the
goods but also on the risks involved and on the space available
on the rescuing ship. (To what extent is it worthwhile and justi-
fied to add load to the rescuing ship?) However, when it is possi-
ble to save a life without incurring risk, admiralty law imposes a
duty to "render assistance to every person who is found at sea in
tect strangers from the release of dangerous prisoners, the duty of landlords to help
trapped trespassers, the duty of voluntary rescuers to continue their rescue efforts, the
duty of drivers who hit another car to stop and rescue the other car's occupants (under
"hit-and-run driver" statutes), and the duty under admiralty law of a vessel involved in a
collision to assist the other vessel. See id at 899-900. See also Richard L. Hasen, Rescue,
in Peter Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 327, 327-
29 (Stockton 1998).
100 Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 936-37 (cited in note 23).
101 Id at 937. See also Wonnell, Unjust Enrichment and Quasi-Contracts at 458-59
(cited in note 98):
The incentive problem with mandatory rescue as opposed to restitutionary re-
gimes is essentially a problem of governmental knowledge. To impose an effi-
cient duty to help, one would need to know about the previous choices available
to potential rescuers and what effect the prospect of liability might have on
those choices.
102 See Wonnell, Unjust Enrichment and Quasi-Contracts at 457-58 (cited in note
98), citing Ross A. Albert, Restitutionary Recovery for Rescuers of Human Life, 74 Cal L
Rev 85, 111-15 (1986).
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danger of being lost."103 In this case, there are no specification
problems-it is clear who should be saved and who the closest
rescuer is-and only minor distributional distortions, since the
costs of pulling a person out of the water are minimal and the
necessary equipment is usually on board the ship.
These features of the law of rescue have been explained
with reference to the omission-commission distinction in Ameri-
can tort law.104 This distinction, however, is not only hard to de-
fine (negligence, for instance, can be viewed as an absence of
taking precautions),105 but it also does not fully explain the law.
(For instance, it does not explain very well in which cases courts
find a "special relationship";10 moreover, there is even criminal
liability for some omissions, such as tax evasion or military de-
sertion.)107 What may be the real concern here is not the fact
that there are many potential rescuers but that it is hard to
specify who among them should rescue; in other words, there are
specification problems.10s
C. Finders
Incentives to find lost, mislaid, or abandoned property are
created by a variety of carrots. First, the finder can receive com-
pensation for expenses incurred in taking care of the good (based
on an implied bailment).109 Second, the owner may offer an
award (as in the archetypical case of the returned lost cat) either
103 Salvage Act of 1912 § 2, Pub L No 62-249, ch 268, 37 Stat 242, 242. See also
Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black Jr, The Law of Admiralty § 8-1 at 532-34 (Founda-
tion 2d ed 1975).
104 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 936 (cited in note 23).
105 See id.
106 See notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
107 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 934 (cited in note 23).
108 One explanation that has been offered for the absence of a general duty to rescue
is that legal sanctions may crowd out more effective moral rewards. See Landes and
Posner, 7 J Legal Stud at 97-98 (cited in note 23). This explanation, however, has two
shortcomings. First, it fails to explain why there is a duty to rescue under admiralty law,
in most civil law countries, and in some common law states. Second, it could be used as
an argument against legal rules in general; prima facie it is indeed not clear why the ar-
gument should only be made in the context of rescue operations. See Hasen, Rescue at
327-28 (cited in note 99). See also Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic
Theory of Personal Motivation 7-10 (Edward Elgar 1997). A second explanation offered
by Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner is that sticks may cause activity-
level distortions (inducing good swimmers to avoid beaches). See Landes and Posner, 7 J
Legal Stud at 120 (cited in note 23). This argument is captured in our model by the more
general notion of distributional distortions. See Part II.B.
109 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 903 (cited in note 23).
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by advertising it beforehand or by deciding to pay one afterward.
Third, the finder may receive ownership; abandoned property
generally goes to the finder,io and, under estray statutes, the
finder may obtain ownership if the good remains unclaimed for a
certain period."'1
There are no sticks related to a failure to find in the sense
that nobody has a duty to find, and those who find an object may
simply ignore the property they discovered-there is no duty to
pick it up and return it to the owner. In contrast, the finder can-
not simply keep the property without trying to find the owner
(or without following the procedure of the estray statutes); in-
centives to do so are generated by sticks.112 The reason is that
finding in itself is an action plagued by enormous specification
problems-information is clearly incomplete as to who the best
finder is and imperfect as to what finding effort should be ex-
pended. Instead, the obligation to follow a certain procedure af-
ter the finding creates no specification problems here-it is clear
what should be done and who should do it-and the costs are
minimal.113
110 See id at 904 (cited in note 23). There are some exceptions. For instance, under
English law treasures go to the government. Under American admiralty law, the finder
of an abandoned or derelict ship in principle gains title to the vessel, but, in some cases
(historic abandoned shipwrecks "embedded" in submerged lands, shipwrecks in coral
formations, and shipwrecks listed on the National Registry of Historic Places), the state
can claim title and the salvor receives only a reward. See 67B Am Jur 2d Salvage
§§ 3, 53 at 229-30, 277-79 (2010); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 2 Admiralty and Maritime
Law § 16-7 at 180-85 (West 4th ed 2004).
111 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 904 (cited in note 23). One of the reasons for having
this procedure is to distinguish a good-faith finder from a thief.
112 Estray statutes and sticks for finder-keepers who do not follow the procedure ex-
isted as early as the ancient Hittite laws. See id at 922, quoting the Hittite laws:
§ 45. If anyone finds utensils, he shall return them to the owner and he shall
reward him. But if he does not return them he is a thief.
§ 71. If anyone finds an ox or a horse or a mule, he shall bring it to the royal
gate. But if he finds it in the country, it shall be brought before the elders and
he may continue to harness it. But if its owner finds it and receives it as it was,
he shall not hold him as a thief. If he does not bring it before the elders, he is a
thief.
113 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 906 (cited in note 23) CIt is difficult, as a law en-
forc[ement] matter, to identify potential finders who simply ignore lost property (as op-
posed to misbehaving finders who convert the property for their own use).").
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D. Takings and Regulatory Takings
Public authorities can use sticks or carrots to make citizens
perform certain tasks. Sticks are used for numerous inexpensive
tasks, such as the duty to vote or to count votes (which exists in
many countries),114 the duty to remove snow from the sidewalk
in front of one's house,115 the duty to stop at red traffic lights,116
or the duty to throw litter in trash bins (rather than on the
beach).117 However, sticks are sometimes also used for tasks that
require high effort costs from all citizens (or families) equally,
such as the duty to serve in the army 18 or on juries.11
Carrots are used for many other tasks, such as public pro-
curements or compensating those who serve as full-time public
official.120 Moreover, the transfer of property under eminent
domain is essentially a carrot system. (Strictly speaking, it is a
mixed system since refusal to deliver the property is sanctioned
with sticks, but the purpose of compensation is to fully compen-
sate the owner, and the only reason why the price is determined
by a court and why a stick accompanies the carrot is that hold-
outs need to be prevented.)121
The logic behind all this seems again to be as follows: car-
rots are used when there are specification problems-when it is
not clear who should deliver a good or service (Who should de-
liver pencils? Who should serve in Afghanistan?)--or when
sticks would lead to singling-out problems because the required
114 See, for example, Stefan Krasa and Mattias K. Polborn, Is Mandatory Voting Bet-
ter Than Voluntary Voting?, 66 Games & Econ Beh 275, 275-77 (2009) (providing the
example of mandatory voting laws in Australia in its comparative analysis of mandatory
versus voluntary voting).
115 See, for example, NYC Admin Code § 16-123.
116 See, for example, 7A Am Jur 2d Automobiles § 238 at 695--96 (2007).
117 See, for example, La Rev Stat Ann § 33:4881.
118 See Part I.H.
119 To the extent that members of juries receive some compensation, it is usually
strongly undercompensatory. In a broader sense, examples also include the prohibition of
theft (which can be interpreted as a duty to give up easy opportunities to enrich oneself,
and which therefore require each citizen to incur a high opportunity cost, though of
course each citizen benefits from the others not stealing). See Jacob Nussim and Av-
raham D. Tabbach, Deterrence and Avoidance, 29 Intl Rev L & Econ 314, 320 (2009).
120 See, for example, 63C Am Jur 2d Public Officers and Employees § 265 at 734-36
(2009) (providing general information regarding compensation for public officials); 48
CFR §§ 1.000-1.603.
121 Note that to solve the holdout problem, sticks are the appropriate solution: the
distributional distortions are low and there is no incomplete or imperfect information
problem.
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effort is high and unequally distributed among the population
(which is the case when property is taken for a highway project).
The singling-out problem is an important issue in case law
and in the literature on regulatory takings. The Fifth Amend-
ment states that takings of property in the public interest need
to be compensated. Such compensation is nearly always paid in
the case of the physical taking of property. But when zoning
laws or other forms of regulation greatly reduce property values
though formally leaving the title with the owner, compensation
for regulatory takings may be claimed.122 Under Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's "diminution of value" test in Pennsylvania
Coal Co v Mahon,123 compensation is due if a regulation "goes too
far" in diminishing the value of the property to the owner.124
Justice Holmes did not specify his criterion very well, but the
emphasis is clearly on the excessiveness of the distributional
distortions caused by sticks.125
Singling out is also the central point of the well-known dis-
senting opinion of Justice William Rehnquist in Penn Central
Transportation Co v New York City,126 according to which there
is no regulatory taking if the prohibition does not single out
individuals but "applies over a broad cross section of land and
thereby 'secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage.' "127 A
similar position is taken in Agins v City of Tiburon,128 where the
Court held that a landowner subject to a zoning ordinance "will
share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's
exercise of its police power. In assessing the fairness of the
zoning ordinances, these benefits must be considered along with
any diminution in market value that the appellants might
suffer."129 Professor Richard Epstein reframed the point by
stating the benefits from the zoning restrictions on other owners
122 See, for example, Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 (1960).
123 260 US 393 (1922).
124 Id at 415 (reviewing a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited coal
companies from any mining that created a safety risk for the surface owners due to
cave-ins).
125 Id at 416.
126 438 US 104 (1978).
127 Id at 147 (Rehnquist dissenting), quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 US at 415.
128 447 US 255 (1980).
129 Id at 262.
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may in some cases form sufficient in-kind compensation.130 As
Professor Epstein put it,
[T]he more similar the situations between neighbours, the
more likely it is that the restrictions in question will work
for the benefit of all. Each landowner knows that he will
profit and lose to the same extent as his neighbours....
Conversely, restrictions that hit one party harder than the
next are likely to work an implicit redistribution of wealth
from one party to another.131
E. Endangered Species Act
The federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) contains prohibi-
tions against the "taking" of endangered species. "Taking" in
this context refers not only to killing but also to habitat modifi-
cation.132 One of the protections with the largest economic im-
pact is that of the red-cockaded woodpecker.133 Woods that house
red-cockaded woodpecker populations or that are located near
them are subject to costly timber-harvest restrictions.13 The Act
has serious unintended consequences because landowners can
avoid the regulatory burden by prematurely harvesting their
forests, by planting mixed woods instead of homogenous pine
woods, or by planting no pine trees at all.1a5
130 Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
195-215 (Harvard 1985). See also Richard A. Epstein, Takings, in Peter Newman, ed,
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 561, 567 (Stockton 1998).
181 Epstein, Takings at 567 (cited in note 130).
132 50 CFR § 17.3.
138 See Daowei Zhang and Warren A. Flick, Sticks, Carrots, and Reforestation In-
vestment, 77 Land Econ 443, 445 (2001). This woodpecker lives in southern pine forests
and feeds on insects on mature pine trees near its den. It prefers homogenous pine forest
(rather than mixed forest) with few under-trees. It also needs mature pine trees (prefer-
ably those that have been infected with the red heart fungus) to chisel out its den cavity.
See id (detailing the unique characteristics of the red-cockaded woodpecker).
134 See id. For instance, pine trees greater than ten inches in diameter cannot be cut
without first assessing the potential effect on red-cockaded woodpeckers. Cavity trees
may not be cut or damaged at all. See id.
135 See Dean Lueck and Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction under
the Endangered Species Act, 46 J L & Econ 27, 51-55 (2003) (finding that forest land-
owners in North Carolina who are closer to populations of endangered red-cockaded
woodpeckers are more likely to prematurely harvest their forests and to choose shorter
forest rotations); Zhang and Flick, 77 Land Econ at 445 (cited in note 133) (finding that
the ESA reduced reforestation investments on sites close to known endangered species
habitats); David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U Pa L Rev
655, 656 (1995) (showing how the threat of regulation creates a race to develop wilder-
ness before the regulation is put into place). For a general discussion of the impact of
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Our framework can help to better understand why the ESA
has those undesirable side effects and why subsidies or tax cred-
its would be better instruments, as suggested by some commen-
tators. 136 The ESA is based on sticks. The problem with sticks
here is their distributional distortions.17 The law requires a sig-
nificant effort from a small group of individuals (singling-out
problems) and by using sticks it does not compensate them for
their effort. As we have discussed, distributional distortions can
lead to several types of economic costs, one of which is activity-
level distortions.138
If carrots (in the form of subsidies or tax incentives) were
used instead,139 then these distributional distortions could be
avoided, as could the unintended activity-level distortions. For
instance, studies have empirically shown that public financial-
assistance programs have a positive impact on reforestation.140
F. Incentives to Acquire Information in Contracts
Our analysis may also shed a new light on the question as to
what extent potential contract parties have a duty to acquire
and reveal information.141 The standard analysis of Professor
Anthony Kronman holds that the least-cost information gather-
er should produce and reveal information, except in situations in
which information is costly to acquire and revealing it would de-
stroy the incentives to produce it.142 Professor Steven Shavell
added the insight that buyers have greater difficulties in bene-
fiting from information because the good about which they have
information is in the hands of the seller, who may easily free
regulations on investment, see, for example, Epstein, Takings: Private Property at 263-
82 (cited in note 130).
136 See, for example, Zhang and Flick, 77 Land Econ at 444 (cited in note 133).
137 The problem with sticks in this example is not due to transaction costs. As a
matter of fact, transaction costs are lower under a sticks regime because sticks do not
have to be applied and effort costs do not have to be compensated.
138 See Part II.B.
139 See Zhang and Flick, 77 Land Econ at 444 (cited in note 133); Epstein, Takings:
Private Property at 263-82 (cited in note 130).
140 See Zhang and Flick, 77 Land Econ at 446-48 (cited in note 133).
141 Note that while our model may be unable to fully address contractual situations
because we did not consider "participation constraints" (that is, compensation in the
form of a higher or lower price or wage that may have to be promised in order to make
someone assent to a carrots or sticks regime), it nevertheless applies to the actions of
parties before a contract is signed.
142 Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Con-
tracts, 7 J Legal Stud 1, 9 (1978).
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ride on the buyer's efforts.143 How can we reframe the analysis in
terms of carrots and sticks?
Incentives to acquire information are largely created by
sticks for sellers. For instance, sellers have a general duty to re-
veal latent defects (for example, that their homes have been in-
fected by termites) if it can be inferred that they should have
known about the defect.144 This "should have known" criterion is
partly a tool used to overcome evidence problems (in many cases,
the party who should have known that there were termites did
effectively know it) but partly also a mechanism to generate in-
centives to acquire this type of information. The use of sticks
here is consistent with our framework because in most cases
there are no specification problems: it is clear that of all citizens
the owner of a good is in the best position to acquire information
about that good.146 Moreover, the "should have known" criterion
means that there is only such a duty when there are no specifi-
cation problems as to the "what" question either. Also, sellers
are less often held liable for omissions (failure to inform) than
for wrong commissions (giving wrong information).146 This is in
line with our analysis because there are more specification prob-
lems associated with the first (What information should be giv-
en?) than with the second (it is usually obvious that it is wrong
to give wrong information).
But incentives to acquire information are also created by
carrots. Buyers with "entrepreneurial" information (for example,
that there is a mine below the surface of a farm or that a paint-
ing is to be attributed to an old master) have in principle no duty
to reveal this information'1 This absence of a duty to reveal in-
formation allows buyers to benefit from entrepreneurial infor-
mation, and this creates a carrot to produce such information.
Here, there are clearly specification problems: ex ante it is not
obvious who in our society is best placed to discover a painting of
an old master or a mine. The situation is analogous to inven-
tions and works of music, literature, or art (Who should invent a
143 Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25
RAND J Econ 20, 33 (1994).
144 See Kronman, 7 J Legal Stud at 23--24 (cited in note 142).
145 The seller's duty to acquire and reveal information may have distributional ef-
fects (the seller having to bear information costs and even becoming impoverished when
she discovers that her property is worth less), but societies usually do not consider these
as "distortions" but as fair adjustments.
146 See Levmore, 72 Va L Rev at 879 (cited in note 23).
147 See Kronman, 7 J Legal Stud at 9-18 (cited in note 142).
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new technique or compose a new song?), and so is the solution-
though there are technical differences with respect to how car-
rots are created by the legal system (for example, granting intel-
lectual property rights for inventions and music or allowing
physical property to be acquired without being sued for misrep-
resentation for mines and old master paintings).
But sometimes the legal system uses carrots for sellers as
well. For instance, the owner of shares of a corporation does not
need to reveal why she sells them. Maybe she did research and
discovered that the company is less promising than the market
believes. But unlike in the termites cases, no stick is used to
make her reveal that information.148 Here, it is not clear who is
the least-cost information gatherer. Can the owner do such re-
search more efficiently than anyone else in society? That is not
so clear-in other words, there are specification problems. So in-
stead, the incentives are created indirectly by carrots (in con-
trast to direct carrots, such as patents), for instance by not re-
quiring the seller to warrant the value, not holding the better
informed buyer liable for misrepresentation, or by allowing
techniques such as shorting.
Our carrots-versus-sticks framework complements Professor
Kronman's "least-cost information gatherer" principle by direct-
ing the attention to whether we know who the least-cost infor-
mation gatherer iS.149 Very often we do know (because the seller
is naturally better placed to acquire most types of information
on the goods she owns), and then sticks are used. But if we don't,
then carrots are used.
G. Contract Bonuses
Should contract breachers be penalized or should nonbreach-
ers receive a bonus?150 Contract law treatises tend to mention only
148 See id at 26.
149 Id at 9, 32-33.
150 Our results should be applied with caution in a contractual context for two rea-
sons. First, we did not consider the possible effect of participation constraints and entry
fees. Yet to the extent that contracts are incomplete and delegate authority to one of the
parties, a situation occurs that may not be so different analytically from pure authority
relationships such as parent-child or state-citizen. And to the extent that contracts are
not read by the parties that sign them, the situation comes analytically closer to the non-
contractual framework we have analyzed, though formally they remain contracts.
But second, the analytical difference between carrots and sticks may become vague
when the probability of enforcement equals 1, which is often the case in contracts (in
those cases, there is still a difference between carrots and sticks with respect to built-in
compensation, but it may be analytically hard to distinguish between the compensation
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sticks: damages, specific performance (under the threat of crimi-
nal sanctions for contempt of court), or stipulated damages.51
But in practice, there seems to be a tendency to increasingly use
carrots as well. Corporate executives may receive bonuses for
exceptional performances.152 Workers in the auto industry who
propose ideas to improve production processes may receive a re-
ward (we are unaware of any manufacturer that penalizes em-
ployees who do not come up with such ideas).153 Salespersons
with the best results may receive a free cruise to the Caribbean
Sea. How can we explain the general emphasis of the law on
sticks and the tendency of the market toward carrots?
In most contracts, there are no serious specification prob-
lems. Building contracts, for instance, specify in a very detailed
way what the builder should do.'" As a result, our analysis sug-
gests that sticks are superior.'rs But employment contracts and
relational contracts more generally are highly incomplete. In the
examples above, specifying what CEOs should do to improve the
profits of the company may be very hard. By the same token, it
may be impossible to specify which worker should generate good
ideas to improve production processes or what each salesperson
should do to achieve record sales. Because of these specification
problems, carrots become superior.
H. Incentives in the Military
Armies often require enormous effort costs from their sol-
diers, and it is therefore interesting to view whether such efforts
are induced through carrots or sticks.
of the carrot and the normal price or wage for the service). Note, however, that even car-
rots or sticks that are intended to be nonprobabilistic may in fact be probabilistic when
evidentiary problems make enforcement less than perfect. In those cases, the risk and
transaction-costs analysis becomes relevant again. Note also that carrots may also in-
volve more risks for the lawmaker who has to finance the carrots.
151 See, for example, Jeffrey Ferriell and Michael Navin, Understanding Contracts
1-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
152 We admit that some of these bonuses have little to do with real "carrots" but are
rather ways to frame high wages in such a way that they become tax deductible or hard-
er to criticize by shareholders and outsiders. See Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay
without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 124-27 (Har-
vard 2004).
- 153 See Mbire Kerrin and Nick Oliver, Collective and Individual Improvement Activi-
ties: The Role of Reward Systems, 31 Personnel Rev 320, 328-34 (2002).
154 See Elkins Manor Associates v Eleanor Concrete Works, Inc, 396 SE2d 463, 469
(W Va 1990).
155 Moreover, because contract breach is typically verifiable by a court, there is no
real danger of abuse of sticks by uncontrolled, nonbenevolent lawmakers.
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The decision to join the army can be based on either sticks
or carrots. General conscription is a stick system. Adult men are
obliged to contribute to a public good (safety) in the form of a
service under the threat of a criminal sanction. A professional
army is a carrot system: Volunteers are attracted to the army by
a wage (a carrot, which is financed by taxes). If the army needs
the entire population of young males, there are no specification
problems (it is clear what all males should do), and no singling-
out problems (all families affected in similar ways, so that exist-
ing wealth distributions are not distorted).156 Therefore, our re-
sults suggest that sticks will be used.
If the army requires only a minority of the young male pop-
ulation and the same degree of specialization is needed, specifi-
cation problems occur: Who should join the army? Moreover, a
stick system would cause severe distributional distortions be-
cause the minority that would have to go to the army without
compensation would be significantly impoverished. Therefore,
our analysis suggests that carrots are superior.
Concerning the incentives to follow rules, military boot
camps are notorious examples of stick-based enforcement sys-
tems. This is in line with our analysis because there are usually
no specification problems. It is not only clear what the optimal
rules are-such as the fact that equipment should be properly
maintained, that orders from higher-ranked officers need to be
executed, or that soldiers should greet and march in a standard-
ized way, and that no soldier should ever desert-but also who
should do it: everybody of a certain rank.
Still, armies use carrots as well-war heroes receive medals.
Medals are usually not awarded to those with the most danger-
ous tasks (such as those who fought in the front line) but rather
to soldiers who undertook more risks than they were explicitly
asked to. 57 This indicates that the situation in which the heroic
act took place had some uniqueness and unpredictability (that
is, there were specification problems) because otherwise formal
orders could have been formulated.
Another example of carrots in armies is promotion. Also
here it is not prima facie clear which individuals are best suited
for higher positions. By attaching carrots to the relatively scarce
higher positions, individuals who believe they have the right
156 Exceptions often granted to the only sons of single mothers confirm this point.
157 See, for example, 10 USC § 3741 (providing the criteria for awarding the Medal
of Honor).
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capabilities are given an incentive to reveal their type and exert
the right efforts. Of course, penalties for those who did not ob-
tain a promotion would create the same incentives but because
only a minority is promoted, carrots are superior.
I. Slave Societies
A slave owner is the archetypical nonbenevolent rulemaker:
he does not aim for what is good for the slave or for society but
for what is good for himself. Moreover, legal systems that permit
slavery usually only rarely monitor the reasonableness of the
lawmaker's decisions.158
Unsurprisingly, sticks are largely preferred to carrots in
master-slave relationships. Carrots have a built-in compensa-
tion and exploitation-preventing mechanism (Difference 6), but
sticks do not. Therefore, it should not surprise us that someone
who wants to exploit somebody else will choose sticks.
But this picture is incomplete because there is a well-
documented use of carrots in master-slave relationships. For ex-
ample, in ancient Rome, those slaves who were assigned mana-
gerial or intellectual tasks were often rewarded with gifts, mon-
ey, or the concession of freedom.159 The use of carrots and the
size of the rewards have been shown to depend on the task as-
signed: slave-workers (those carrying out physical tasks) were
mostly subjected to sticks, slave-managers (those carrying out
managerial tasks, such as the administration of a workshop)
were given moderate carrots, and slave-entrepreneurs (those
who were given assets to autonomously run a business in the in-
terest of their master) received the largest carrots.o60
158 See Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross at 128-29 (cited in note 39).
159 See Fenoaltea, 44 J Econ Hist at 639, 657 (cited in note 39).
160 See id at 636:
Since slaves (and "wage slaves) may be driven by pain incentives, they may
find themselves locked into Pareto-stable gang labor in effort-intensive activi-
ties. Where the worker's productivity depends overwhelmingly on his brute ef-
fort and negligibly on his carefulness, that is to say, a shift to a system that
eliminates the supervisor and lets the worker retain his marginal product
would not yield a reduction in total labor costs, precisely because the attendant
shift from pain incentives to ordinary rewards causes a reduction in the work-
er's effort and productivity. In care-intensive activities, in contrast, the substi-
tution of care for effort does not reduce the worker's productivity; a shift from
supervised gang work with pain incentives to self-supervised work with ordi-
nary rewards will therefore be profitable, other things being equal, and the
predictions of the simple model recalled above will hold good.
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Why would a slave owner ever use carrots? Because of altru-
ism? Maybe. But the use of carrots can also be explained in
terms of specification problems: managerial and entrepreneurial
tasks tend to be more difficult to define ex ante. It is hard to
specify what exactly a slave who runs a business should do to
make it more successful. Moreover, managerial skills are more
difficult to identify ex ante than physical strength and good
health. Therefore, the slave owner may not know what skill level
a slave is able to reach. As a result, with sticks, the master may
actually at times punish his slaves even though they exerted
their maximum effort. But why would a slave owner care about
that? In some cases the reason was altruism. But even to a self-
ish, nonempathic master the application of sticks was costly be-
cause it could destroy the investment he made in the slave.
Sticks consisted mostly of physical punishments or death and
slaves were traded on a market that priced them depending on
their abilities. Therefore, the master internalized at least part of
the costs caused by the use of sticks.161 As a result, it was con-
venient, even for nonbenevolent masters, to use carrots whenev-
er the complexity of the situation made stick-based command-
and-control regimes vulnerable to severe errors. 162
J. Health Policy
Health policy provides some clear examples of the pattern of
use of carrots and sticks. Some activities that are harmful for
individuals are also the object of state intervention in light of
the externalities that they impose on society. Three clear exam-
ples are driving, smoking, and eating. Each of these activities
presents some risk for the individual: driving might result in an
For more literature analyzing slavery from an economic perspective, see Daron Ace-
moglu and Alexander Wolitzky, The Economics of Labor Coercion, 79 Econometrica 555
(2011); Nils-Petter Lagerlof, Slavery and Other Property Rights, 76 Rev Econ Stud 319
(2009); Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-
Agent Model, 100 Econ J 1109 (1990); Yoram Barzel, An Economic Analysis of Slavery,
20 J L & Econ 87 (1977); Giorgio Canarella and John A. Tomaske, The Optimal Utiliza-
tion of Slaves, 35 J Econ Hist 621 (1975); Ronald Findlay, Slavery, Incentives, and Man-
umission: A Theoretical Model, 83 J Polit Econ 923 (1975); T. Bergstrom, On the Exist-
ence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy, 38 Rev Econ Stud
23 (1971); Evsey D. Domar, The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis, 30 J Econ
Hist 18 (1970); Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, The Economics of Slavery: And
Other Studies in Econometric History 82-84 (Aldine 1964).
161 See Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross at 55 (cited in note 39).
162 For an historical and economic analysis, see generally Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci,
Slavery and Information, 73 J Econ Hist (forthcoming 2013).
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accident, smoking might result in cancer, and unhealthy eating
habits might result in cardiovascular diseases and a host of oth-
er food-related illnesses.163 Remarkably, these activities are sub-
ject to very different types of state intervention.
Injuries from driving are prevented through the use of
sticks, such as the obligation to wear safety belts or the use of
speed limits.164 This can be explained by the fact that the traffic
rules are rather homogeneous (no incomplete information),16
and compliance with traffic regulations is relatively easy to de-
tect (no imperfect information) and imposes similar costs on all
individuals (no distributional distortions). The problems caused
by smoking are tackled by taxes on cigarettes and smoking bans,
which are sticks, but smoking as such is not prohibited.166 This
can be explained by the fact that prohibiting smoking in public
areas can be easily done without inducing specification problems
or great distributional distortions with sticks while prohibiting
smoking as such would require a ban on the sale of cigarettes
and more pervasive controls-witness the costs of the war on
drugs.
At the other extreme is the enforcement of healthy eating
habits. In this case ... carrots are the norm! Imposing sticks on
unhealthy eating would impose enormous specification prob-
lems-as to who should eat what-ex post monitoring problems,
and distributional distortions-due to the variety of tastes and
needs. Instead, the state often sponsors plans to induce healthy
habits by (directly or indirectly) subsidizing healthy activities,
163 See Surgeon General, How Tobacco Smoke Causes Disease: The Biology and Be-
havioral Basis for Smoking-Attributable Disease 1, 5 (Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices 2010), online at http/www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/tobaccosmoke/
executivesummary.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013); Nancy T. Artinian, et al, Interventions to
Promote Physical Activity and Dietary Lifestyle Changes for Cardiovascular Risk Factor
Reduction in Adults: A Scientific Statement from the American Heart Association, 122
Circulation 406, 407 (2010); Eleni Petridou and Maria Moustaki, Human Factors in the
Causation of Road Traffic Crashes, 16 Eur J Epidemiology 819, 820-23 (2000).
164 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts Re-
search Note: The Increase in Lives Saved, Injuries Prevented, and Cost Savings if Seat
Belt Use Rose to at Least 90 Percent in All States 1 (Department of Transportation May
2009), online at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811140.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013).
165 Differences in driving abilities are plausibly not so pronounced to justify subject-
specific rules, although speed limits can be tailored to the type of vehicle.
166 See A. Blake Brown, Cigarette Taxes and Smoking Restrictions: Impacts and Pol-
icy Implications, 77 Am J Ag Econ 946, 946 (1995).
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such as indoor or outdoor sports or bio-industry, thus working
with carrots rather than sticks.167
K. Parenting and Education
Carrots and sticks are also used outside the law, in educa-
tion for instance. There is a general tendency among psycholo-
gists to be more favorable toward carrots than toward sticks.168
This emphasis on positive incentives is often attributed to the
influence of behaviorism, the most popular school of thought in
American psychology.169 The so-called Law of Effect states that
when behavior is followed by a positive consequence ("positive
reinforcement"), it will be repeated.170 When behavior is followed
by a negative consequence, it is not certain that the desired be-
havior will be chosen instead.
Our analysis suggests that the emphasis of contemporary
psychologists on carrots may be more than a coincidental by-
product of the popularity of behaviorism. Instead, it may be a
feature of a more complex society, in which it is less clear what
to expect from children. Consider children that were raised on a
traditional farm in pre-industrial times. For parents it was clear
that the children would become farmers, too.171 It was also clear
what capabilities and attitudes good farming involved (exactly
the same as the parents had). Since there were no specification
problems, sticks were the optimal type of sanction. It is much
less clear what makes a good doctor, attorney, merchant, or art-
ist, and it is not immediately evident what talents a child pos-
sesses. Therefore, most modern parents are reluctant to use
punishments when a child sings out of tune or even when he
does not receive an A on a math test (because parents may not
know for sure whether the child is able to do better-that is,
there are specification problems-and using sticks would often
167 See, for example, Mi-Ae Jung and Joseph Wong, Pathways to Bio-Industry Devel-
opment: Institutional Changes in the Global Economy *2-3 (Imperial College London
Business School, Opening Up Innovation: Strategy, Organization and Technology Con-
ference Paper, June 2010), online at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/
viewpaper.php?id=501509&cf=43 (visited Mar 3, 2013).
168 See, for example, Kohn, Punished by Rewards at 3 (cited in note 42).
169 See id at xi.
170 See Edward Lee Thorndike, Educational Psychology 114-41 (Columbia 2d ed
1910). See generally C.B. Ferster and B.F. Skinner, Schedules of Reinforcement (Apple-
ton-Century-Crofts 1957).
171 See James A. Henretta, Families and Farms: Mentaliti in Pre-industrial Ameri-
ca, 35 Wm & Mary Q 3, 21-26 (1978).
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result in punishing those who are simply unable to comply with
the norm). So instead, parents will use carrots for good singing
or math performances. But modern parents will still use sticks
when it comes to enforcing traffic rules. For instance, they may
punish a child who crossed the street without looking. In those
cases there are no specification problems-it is obvious what
should be expected from each child.
Overall, in complex societies, parenting will increasingly be
based on carrots-at least, this is what our theoretical results
suggest.
CONCLUSION
Whether legal systems should use carrots or sticks is an im-
portant and largely unexplored question. We have argued that
there is an increasing tendency in modern legal systems to use
carrots. To explain this trend and to develop normative guide-
lines for further use of carrots and sticks, we have analyzed
their effects on transaction costs, risks, and the distribution of
wealth.
We found that in simple settings, sticks are superior to car-
rots. Indeed, if the lawmaker is fully informed about the capabil-
ities of the citizens, and all citizens are very similar, the law-
maker will expect the same from all citizens and will be certain
that the sticks are costly enough so that all citizens comply. Be-
cause all will comply, the sticks are mere threats that do not
have to be applied. Sticks incentivize by threatening while car-
rots incentivize by actually rewarding; in an ideal world, fines
are never paid, but prizes are. As a result, sticks yield fewer
transaction costs and less risk for complying citizens. Moreover,
sticks generate fewer distributional distortions when the citi-
zens are sufficiently homogenous with respect to effort costs.
However, if the lawmaker is not fully informed about the
citizens' individual effort costs, possibly because citizens differ
so much, sticks lose some of these intrinsic advantages because
the lawmaker may demand compliance from citizens who are
not able to comply at a reasonable cost. The more citizens violate
the norm, the more often sticks must be applied, which gener-
ates transaction costs and risk and may distort the existing dis-
tribution of resources by impoverishing those who are unable to
comply. This can be reframed in terms of specification problems:
if the lawmaker has difficulties in specifying what to expect from
each citizen-that is, if the lawmaker does not know which citizen
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is able to do what-then carrots may become superior. This may
help to explain why copyrights are used for composers and why
carrots play an important role in modern parenting.
But even when the lawmaker is completely informed about
each citizen's effort cost, carrots can be superior when the de-
manded effort costs vary among citizens. Carrots have the ad-
vantage that they can correct this distributional effect by being
individualized (that is, set higher for those with higher effort
costs). Individualizing sticks, in contrast, does not correct distri-
butional distortions because sticks are in principle not applied to
compliers. This result can be reframed in terms of the singling-
out danger: if the lawmaker needs to obtain substantially higher
effort from some individuals than from others, carrots may be-
come superior because they generate fewer side effects in terms
of unintended distributional distortions (which may in turn lead
to other economic problems, such as activity-level distortions).
Overall, our analysis suggests that, as societies become
more complex, and labor more specialized, carrots tend to be
used more often.
Of course, a word of caution is warranted. "Carrots versus
sticks" is a complex problem that remains understudied. While
this Article attempts to draw a broad picture of the factors that
bear on the use of carrots and sticks, we still assumed away a
number of complications that could influence our theoretical re-
sults and normative guidelines. The main limitation of our anal-
ysis is that we used a narrowly defined rational choice frame-
work and discarded psychological effects. But we have tried to
show that much of the law can be explained without taking be-
havioral distortions into account. Other complications we did not
consider are annullable carrots and sticks,172 entry fees to enter
into a carrot or stick system, the distributional effects of the tax
system that is needed to finance carrots, and the possibility of
combining carrots with sticks.
Finally, we offer a short theoretical reflection on the funda-
mental question of why carrots and sticks are not just mirror
images. Two fundamental factors are responsible for the asym-
metry between carrots and sticks. The first is that the lawmaker
wants compliance, not violation. Compliance is the desired and
therefore "normal" state of the world. To illustrate, carrots
172 See De Geest, Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers, 29 Intl Rev L & Econ at 352-57 (cited
in note 28).
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generate transaction costs in case of compliance, sticks in case of
violation; carrots create risks for compliers, sticks for violators.
Both differences are symmetrical and in essence caused by the
sign of the sanctions (that is, whether they are positive or nega-
tive). Yet if the lawmaker is fully informed about the effort costs,
all citizens will be induced to comply, and sticks will become su-
perior with respect to both transaction costs and risk costs. This
difference is ultimately driven by the fact that the lawmaker
wants compliance, not violation.
The second fundamental factor that is responsible for the
asymmetry between carrots and sticks is the wealth effect: car-
rots make citizens wealthier than sticks. This explains many of
the distributional differences but also why some problems are
more severe under sticks than under carrots. One example of an
asymmetrical difference that is driven by this wealth effect is
that carrots are less prone to abuse than sticks. Another exam-
ple is that only individualized carrots produce different distribu-
tional effects from general carrots while individualized and gen-
eral sticks have the same distributional effects; as a result, only
(individualized) carrots can prevent some unintended distribu-
tional side effects.
These are just some examples of asymmetrical differences.
They prove that carrots and sticks are not just mirror images of
each other. Therefore, we should not be surprised that different
societies use them differently.
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